A REPORT OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

&

SUGGESTIONS FOR

STRATEGIC

DIRECT DEMOCRATIC

TYCHIFORMATION

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CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION

Ishmael, in "Moby Dick", relates the tale of his adventures at sea. Like Ishmael, I wish to relate my adventures, albeit, I wish in this book to relate my adventures in thought.

The book is comprised of two parts. In "Part I", I will relate certain aspects of my experience. In "Part II", I will attempt to derive suggestions for action based on the results of my experience.

The aspects of my experience that I will recount relate to research in philosophy, and to professional experience in architecture, urban design, and urban planning. The period of my experience that I will cover comprises four decades, roughly from 1960 to 2000.

Being an architect by training, it was not unusual for me to get involved in the related fields of urban design and urban planning. However, I wish to explain at the outset how I drifted into the field of philosophy where I had no formal training.

I received my architectural education from 1952 to 1957. The main course of study, as is usual in schools of architecture, was design studio. Our instructors in design studio had graduate degrees from different reputable international institutions. As my fellow students and I struggled to learn the secrets of the profession however, instructors with different academic backgrounds gave us conflicting and often contradictory critique of our efforts. I myself often changed my opinion about the works I liked and disliked, including projects that I had conceived myself. I was not confident about what to consider 'good' or 'bad' in the field, and did not understand what causes disagreement in the field. This uncertainty, and the hesitation that it caused when I was engaged in developing a design scheme, triggered the developments that ultimately led to writing this book.

In the summer of 1957, I graduated at the top of my class. Following prevailing tradition, I was appointed assistant instructor in the school of architecture from which I graduated. Shortly there after I received a scholarship to prepare a doctorate in architecture at an internationally renowned institute of technology. When I contemplated the selection of a subject for my thesis, I thought that I had a rare opportunity to think, and wanted to apply myself to the 'most important' subject that I can think of. Rather than select a type of building for study, I thought that the 'most important' subject I could address would be the general issue of what is 'good' and 'bad' in architecture; the issue which had long perplexed me. Tackling this issue amounted to addressing theory of architecture. I hoped that my study would help me in reaching answers to the major queries that I entertained about architecture, and thus, could help me to conceive proposals to reduce disagreement and conflict in the field.

I started my research around 1961, and spent considerable time reading under the dome of the library of the institute where I was preparing my thesis. I began with writings by famous architects, and books on theory of architecture. My recollection is that I did not find answers to my queries in what I read. For example, some books referred to 'good proportion' as 'prerequisite' to 'good architecture' without defining what 'good proportion' is. When 'good proportion' was defined, it was defined differently by different authors. Generally, different architectural styles were promoted, and I was unable to discern areas of general consensus. However, theory of architecture commonly maintains that architecture involves 'functional' and 'aesthetic aspects'. Starting from this premise, and from the notion that issues relating to 'functional aspects' are amenable to general

agreement, I surmised that disagreement and contradiction in the field of architecture probably arise from different preferences relating to the 'aesthetic aspects' of buildings. This position led me to seek answers in the field of aesthetics.

I read on aesthetics in architecture and aesthetics in general, and came with a feeling of dissatisfaction similar to the one I got from reading on theory of architecture. I also read about experimental aesthetics, and how it 'failed' in its attempts to apply scientific methods in establishing criteria for 'excellence', such as criteria regarding proportion in a 'golden section'.

In my reading on aesthetics, reference was often made to the subject of perception as 'key' to understanding the experience of 'aesthetic quality'. In my search for clarification of issues, one book led to another, and I read on the physiological, psychological, and philosophical explanations of perception, and further, on the subjects of psychology, and philosophy in general. Thus, the decision to tackle the subject of theory of architecture as the theme of my doctoral thesis initiated my drift into philosophy.

"Part I" of this book covers the aspects of my experience that I wish to relate to the reader. It is comprised of five chapters. "Chapter 1" presents some of the views that I encountered in philosophy, and indicates how certain views influenced my thinking. "Chapter 2" expresses the main consequences of my research in philosophy. One of these consequences, 'sadly', was that my drift into philosophy led me to abandon my doctoral thesis. How this transpired is explained in "Chapter 2". Around 1965, I returned full time to professional practice. I was involved over the years in architectural, urban design, and urban planning assignments. "Chapter 3" provides a brief account of my professional experience in these fields. In particular, as I will explain, my experience in urban planning in recent years inspired me to write this book. Accordingly, I have elaborated on addressing the subject of urban planning in chapters 4 and 5. "Chapter 4" attempts to familiarize the reader with the field. "Chapter 5" indicates some of the main results of my experience in urban planning, and concludes my report of personal experience. In "Chapter 5" I explain my reasons for writing this book, and how I decided to explore the potential for deriving suggestions for action based on the results of my experience.

"Part II" comprises two chapters, and describes how I conceived suggestions for action. "Chapter 6" indicates some of the thoughts that occurred to me in this respect, and describes how I conceived the notion of "tychiformation". The reader need not bother to look up the meaning of the word in the dictionary. I coined the word myself in December 1998. 'Tychiformation' embodies suggestions derived from the results of both my theoretical research and practical experience. What I mean by it is expressed in "Chapter 7".

An "Epilogue" concludes the tale of my adventures in thought.

Part I REPORT OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

Chapter 1 RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY

Foreword

In this chapter I will give a brief account of some of the main views that I encountered through my research in philosophy, and will indicate how certain views influenced my thinking.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, my excursion into philosophy was spurred by my quest for clarification of issues relating to disagreement and contradiction in the field of architecture, in an effort to prepare a doctoral thesis. My research in philosophy progressed from aesthetics, to perception, and proliferated to other philosophical topics. I will present my experience in philosophy roughly in chronological order to the best of my recollection. What I will say is not intended to be neither a comprehensive, nor a balanced presentation of the topics addressed. It is intended to describe my particular experience, and will address topics in proportion to the extent to which they have preoccupied my thoughts in the past. I will initiate the report of my research in philosophy with an introduction of certain terms and classifications that are often involved in discussions of perception.

Discussions of perception usually refer to a generic subject perceiving a generic object. The subject is alternatively referred to as the "perceiver", or the "observer", or sometimes the "beholder", as in the statement "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". Theories of perception commonly discuss how a subject perceives the 'qualities of an object'.

When I perceive an object I can use language to describe it. I may perceive an object and utter the words: "I see a round, red, beautiful object". The words "round", "red", and "beautiful" designate attributes or qualities of the object that I am aware of. Some classical philosophies classify the qualities of objects into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The primary category relates to spatial structure, such as shape and form: "round" in my example. The secondary category relates to color, texture, sound, smell, and taste: "red" in my example. The tertiary category relates to what can be considered a valuation of the object, or a value judgement regarding the object, such as assessing the object to be good or bad: "beautiful" in my example.

Classification of the qualities of objects can be contested. For example, some may maintain that the object is not divisible into categories. One does not perceive the shape of an object without perceiving its color at the same time, and one does not perceive beauty separately from the object. Also, some philosophers prefer to designate color as a primary quality. However, the qualities of objects, can be classified for the purposes of discussion, and my thoughts developed in the past according to the classification indicated above. Therefore, I will use this classification to present the development of my thoughts.

Tertiary qualities of objects, or value judgements regarding objects, may be further classified into aesthetic and non aesthetic; the first subclass relating to value judgements in the field of the fine arts, and the second subclass relating to value judgements outside the field of the fine arts. The distinction of the two subclasses may be understood from the difference in meaning between the words "beautiful" and "good". Quite often however, the distinction is blurred beyond recognition. My intention is to address tertiary qualities in general without classification into subcategories. I

use the term “aesthetic” in conformity with the bulk of literature on the subject of valuation.

Aesthetic Relativism and Aesthetic ‘Absolutism’

Aesthetics is mostly concerned with the explanation of the phenomenon of experiencing aesthetic beauty -which can be considered a subclass of tertiary qualities of objects per my definition. (I will not dwell on relating the explanations that I encountered regarding what constitutes aesthetic beauty, which were not always in agreement.)

Give contradictory assertions from art and architectiral criticism.

I will now focus on the main issue that preoccupied me at the time I was writing my thesis, namely, ***the explanation of how different people*** -or subjects- ***disagree in assessing beauty***.

In aesthetics, generally, I found two main types of explanation of the phenomenon of disagreement in assessment. The two types are themselves conflicting. In summery, one type of explanation asserts that ***beauty is a quality of the object*** which astute individuals are able to perceive, while others for various reasons may not be able to perceive. The second explanation is exemplified in the statement that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”, thus implying that ***beauty is not a quality of the object***, and that differing assessments of the object relate to differences in “the eyes” of different “beholders”. The latter position is referred to as “aesthetic relativism”. I will refer to the first position as “aesthetic absolutism” to highlight its contrast with relativism, although the term is not used in philosophical discussions of aesthetics.

In my research in aesthetics I came across “The Sense of Beauty” by George Santayana (First published by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896, first Dover edition, 1955). I did not read the entire book, and must admit that I was somewhat confused by it. However, I was influenced by a particular passage in the book, where Santayana subscribes to the statement that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”, and expounds aesthetic relativism. He recognizes the opposite notion of aesthetic ‘absolutism’, and addresses both positions (Dover Publications edition, p. 29):

> “If we say that other men should see the beauties we see, it is because we think those beauties ***are in the object***, like its colour, proportion, or size. Our judgement appears to us merely the perception and discovery of an external existence, of the real excellence that is without. But this notion is radically absurd and contradictory. Beauty, as we have seen, is a value; it cannot be conceived as an independent existence which affects our senses and which we consequently perceive. It exists in perception, and cannot exist otherwise. A beauty not perceived is a pleasure not felt, and a contradiction. But modern philosophy has taught us to say the same thing of every element of the perceived world; all are sensations; and their grouping into objects imagined to be permanent and external is the work of certain habits of our intelligence. We should be incapable of surveying or retaining the diffused experiences of life, unless we organized and classified them, and out of the chaos of impressions framed the world of conventional and recognizable objects.
>
> How this is done is explained by the current theories of perception.”

Conclusion

Reading Santayana led me to doubt aesthetic absolutism, and initiated my belief in aesthetic relativism. I believed that ***beauty is not in the object, but is in the eye of the beholder***, and that ***differing assessments of beauty relate to differences in the eyes of different beholders***. However, seeking further explanation of "how this is done", I expanded my research to cover "current theories of perception".

Theories of Perception / Idealism

In my quest to understand perception, I was particularly influenced by a book entitled "Mind, Perception and Science", by Sir Russell Brain, a neurologist who was President of the Royal College of Physicians of London (Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, 1951). The position expounded in the book is referred to as "physiological idealism". I will refer to it sometimes as "idealism" for short. Sir Russell Brain says (p. 4):

> "The neurologist observes the brains of animals and other people. From the behavior of both, and from answers which patients give to his questions, he discovers that, when an object is perceived, a series of events occurs successively in time, beginning with an event in the object and ending with an event in the subject's brain. If the series is interrupted at any point between the object and the cerebral cortex (brain surface) of the subject, the object is not perceived. If the relevant area of the cortex is destroyed, the object is not perceived. But if the relevant area of the cortex is electrically stimulated while the subject is conscious, sense-data of a kind aroused by an object are perceived by the subject. Thus it is held that the event immediately preceding, or perhaps synchronous with the perception of the object is an event of a physio-chemical kind in the subject's cerebral cortex. The cortical neurons are normally excited in the way just described from the external world, but if they should exceptionally be excited in some other way -for example by electrical stimulation or by an epileptic discharge- the appropriate sense-data would still be experienced. The only independently necessary condition for the awareness of sense-data, to use Broad's term (Scientific Thought, London, 1927, 501), is thus an event in the cerebral cortex."

He adds (p. 72-73):

> "I began with perception and tried to show that perceiving is not merely what at first sight it appears to be. I am aware of a world of objects external to me and external to one another. The table over there is brown and hard; the orange on the table is scented and sweet; the bell sounds when struck; the sun in the sky is hot, and so on. But astronomers and physicists have inferred from their experiments with these and similar objects that light travels through space, and that I do not see the sun until nine minutes after the light wave which causes me to see it had left it; and, if in the meantime it had ceased to exist, I shouldn't be aware of the fact, but should still continue to see it for nine minutes after its extinction. The same applies to all other objects, including my own body. I can't see, hear, smell, taste, touch or feel them until after the lapse of time necessary for the appropriate physical disturbance to travel from the object to my body, and then the lapse of the further time required for the nerve-impulse aroused in the sense organ stimulated to travel through my in going nerves and central

nervous system to the part of the brain concerned with sensation. And the neurophysiologist tells me that these nerve-impulses don't resemble the physical stimulus which arouses them, and, as far as is known, the only factor which determines what sensations we shall experience is the part of the brain which the nerve-impulse reaches. Moreover, if the parts of the brain concerned with sensation are excited in some other way -for example, by an electrical stimulus directly applied or by a discharge caused by a disease- the corresponding sensation is still experienced in consciousness. Hence, when we're aware of an object, the sensations by means of which we perceive it can't be part of the physical object, for their physical basis in the brain is the sole necessary condition of their occurrence, and this is physically unlike and occurs later in time than the physical events in the object which make me aware of it."

Sir Russell Brain states (p. 59) -text highlighted by me:

"**If we ask whether the colour of a table is part of the table, the answer is** '**Yes**' **if by table we mean the table in the perceptual** '**world**' **which belongs to each of us**, **but it is** '**No**' **if we mean the table in the physical** '**world**' **which is common to all of us**."

Sir Russell Brain considers a 'problem' in this context (p 54):

"Here, then, is a problem. An event in the observer's brain causes him to experience something; for example see a colour outside his brain. This is what neurologists and physiologists often call 'projection', but this is not a very good name for it, for projection seems to imply throwing something from one place to another, but the colour the observer sees is never anywhere else but where he sees it. He is not aware of any process that could rightly be called projection."

Sir Russell Brain then gives his answer to the 'problem' (p. 61):

"Now we are in a position to see how the idea of the 'projection' of colours, sounds and touches to the external world arises and how it can be explained. We know from the study of physiology and psychology and of the effects of disease of the brain that the simplest brain-event concerned with sensation never occurs in isolation. The nervous system is in constant activity and nerve-impulses are continuously streaming into it from all parts of the body conveying to it 'information' about the position of the body in space and of the various parts of the body in relation to one another. Some of these impulses reach consciousness in the form of direct awareness -'items of information', as it were: others never reach consciousness individually but contribute to the meaning of other items of consciousness. Hence, normally a touch on the hand or the sight of a colour does not merely excite the appropriate area of brain concerned with its own form of sensation: it fits into an elaborate pattern of electrical impulses in many parts of the brain. In terms of consciousness, when we say 'I feel a touch' or 'I see a light' we are isolating, for descriptive purposes, what is in focus of consciousness and neglecting not only the background of experience against which we perceive it but necessarily also the unconscious contributions which the nervous system makes to its meaning. What we perceive is thus always perceived ***in relation to*** the rest of the body and this in turn ***in relation to*** other objects in space. One of the relationships of which we are thus aware is the relationship of externality. The electrical patterns of the nervous system convey to us the information that my hand and my foot are in different positions (that is, as parts of my body they are external to one another) and similarly that the table which I see is in a

different position to my body (that is, external to it)."

Conclusion

For a relatively brief period, roughly forty years ago, I wholly believed physiological idealism. I used quotations from "Mind Perception, and Science" in my thesis, and wrote text reiterating Sir Russell Brain's views. I asserted that ***mental qualities are generated in our minds and can not exist as such in the outside world***. I will comment on this later.

For the time being I wish to confirm that reading Sir Russell Brain clarified Santayana's proposition regarding perception in general. Not only "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". ***The whole object its primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities*** "is in the eye of the beholder"; or rather, "***is in the brain -or mind- of the perceiver***". I thought that physiological idealism embraces and supports aesthetic relativism. It reinforced my belief that ***differing assessments of beauty result from differences in the brains -or minds- of different perceivers***.

Sir Russell Brain, however, mostly addressed the perception of primary and secondary qualities of objects, and although there were clues in "Mind Perception, and Science" regarding the notion of tertiary qualities, Sir Russell Brain did not explicitly address the subject. Accordingly, I searched further for an explanation of "how this is done" with regards to the perception of tertiary qualities. My search led to more reading in psychology and philosophy, and to the formation of certain views regarding tertiary qualities and valuation in general. However, I got entangled in the arguments regarding the perception of primary and secondary qualities, and my thesis went on to address this subject. Therefore, I will continue the discussion of perception, and express further developments in my thoughts in this respect. I will return shortly to address tertiary qualities and valuation.

Theories of Perception / Realism

In philosophy, for every thesis there is usually an antithesis. The opposing view to idealism is referred to as "direct realism". I will refer to it as "realism" for short. Generally, realism maintains the opposing view to that which I quoted from "Mind, Perception, and Science", namely, realism can be said to maintain that ***colors do belong to the physical world which is common to all of us***.

At the time when I believed wholly in idealism, I resisted exposure to the arguments of realism. At some point, however, urged by realist friends, I forced myself to read the arguments of those who oppose idealism. One example of these arguments can be found in the "The Concept of Mind", by Gilbert Ryle (first published by Hutchinson in 1949, and later by Peregrine Books in 1963). The following quotation illustrates Ryle's position (Peregrine edition, p. 190):

> "One of the central negative motives of this book is to show that 'mental' does not denote a status, such that one can sensibly ask of a given thing or event whether it is mental or physical, 'in the mind' or 'in the outside world'. To talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called 'the physical world' is forbidden to house; it is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world. Indeed, it makes no sense to speak as if there could be two or eleven worlds.

> Nothing but confusion is achieved by labeling worlds after particular avocations. Even the solemn phrase 'the physical world' is as philosophically pointless as would be the phrase 'the numismatic world', 'the haberdashery world', or 'the botanical world'."

Conclusion

Reading the arguments of Ryle, and other supporters of realism did not lead me to reject idealism and to embrace realism. The arguments of realism that I encountered generally avoided addressing the physiological processes involved in perception that led me to believe in idealism in the first place. I ultimately remained more sympathetic to the arguments of idealism. However, exposure to the arguments of realism influenced my views, as I will explain next.

Having read Ryle, I began to suspect that the type of philosophical discussions of perception exemplified in idealism and realism, concern matters that are not likely to be ascertained one way or the other, and that I can not adopt idealism as expressing a matter of fact.

At the time I was writing my thesis I decided to address this issue. One chapter of the thesis quoted a thought experiment included in Sir Russell Brain's "Mind Perception, and Science" which is intended to support idealism, and attempted to turn the experiment around against the cause of idealism. I will spare the reader from reciting this chapter, and from further confusion regarding the meaning of "object". I will only cite the common objection of the realist, which states that the physiological idealist initially starts with the notion that the objects, and perceivers that he observes in the course of his scientific work, belong to the outside world. His conclusion that they are in his own brain -or mind can be construed as contradicting his initial premise. My intent in writing the chapter, which I wish to convey to the reader however, was not to disclaim idealism and further the cause of realism, since as I mentioned, I still remained sympathetic to the arguments of idealism. My intent rather was to 'demonstrate that idealism could not be proven'.

My purpose in recalling the above episode in the development of my thoughts about perception is to lead to a certain question. Namely, at some juncture during this episode, I wondered about how I still sympathized with idealism while I thought that it could not be proven? The answer to this question involves views relating to valuation which were developing in parallel to my views about perception. I will express the views regarding valuation next, and give my answer to this question later in the following chapter.

Valuation and Behavior

As I mentioned earlier, I concluded in my thesis that "mental qualities ***are*** generated in our minds and ***can not*** exist as such in the outside world". The text of the thesis went on further:

> "That, however, is not all, for while the qualities discussed above (referring to 'primary' and 'secondary qualities') can be said to stand in the mind as symbolic presentations of one or the other external characteristic, there are still qualities which cannot even be correlated with any external counterparts. These are namely the qualities good and bad, beautiful and ugly, etc., which are more properly grouped under the heading 'value'."

At the time I wrote this passage, I had already gone through several books on psychology, psychoanalysis, and philosophy, and had formed definitive views regarding valuation that I will express next. The views revolve around valuation and action, and the role of 'pleasure' and 'pain' in this context. They constituted the central core of my beliefs.

In the previous discussion I used relatively extensive quotes from "Mind, Perception and Science", which was one single source that closely reflected my beliefs regarding the perception of primary and secondary qualities of objects. The views I am about to express, however, cover an amalgam of ideas that I encountered in my research. Unfortunately, for me, they did not come from a particular single source that I can refer to today. I do not recall either where all the views came from in order to make reference to their sources. I do recall however, that I was influenced by reading "The Principles of Psychology" by Herbert Spencer who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest", and by several books by Bertrand Russell including "A History of Western Philosophy". I did not read Darwin, but learned about evolution, and was influenced by its concepts through the writings of others.

Due to the variety of topics that will be addressed, I will not continue to cite opposing views regarding each topic of discussion as I have tried to do previously, but will present instead only the views that I had come to adopt.

The Shades, Grades, and Opposite Varieties of Tertiary Qualities

Pronouncements relating to tertiary qualities, or value judgements concerning objects, in a way similar to pronouncements relating to colors, indicate different shades. The shades can be discerned in the pronouncements "nice texture", "nice flavor", "nice aroma", and "nice sound" for example. Different shades of 'value' can be said to 'attach' to different types of 'objects'.

Different shades of value may also relate to 'aesthetic' or 'non-aesthetic aspects' of 'objects' as I mentioned earlier. For example a distinction may be made in certain instances between 'aesthetic' and 'functional qualities' based on the difference of the shades of feelings experienced in relation with different objects. The different shades may relate to beauty or to functionality, and lead to the pronouncements "beautiful" or "good" respectively. As I mentioned, the distinction is quite often blurred, and the feelings experienced may be said to involve both aspects combined.

Pronouncements of tertiary qualities also reflect different degrees of intensity, as in the case of colors. The degrees of intensity can be discerned in the pronouncements "good", "very good", and "excellent" for example, and could be represented by a continuum. However, the shades and the grades of intensity come in two '***opposite***' varieties, generally relating to '***good***' and '***bad***', which fade into each other through an area of indifference or neutrality. This can be discerned in the pronouncements that range from "extremely good", and "extremely beautiful", to the opposite of "extremely bad", and "extremely ugly", with "so-so" in between.

Tertiary Qualities, 'Pleasure' and 'Pain', Valuation, and Action

It has been maintained that value judgements and pronouncements of tertiary qualities are generally related in some way to the experience of 'pleasure' and 'pain'. This notion can be recognized from personal every day experience. For example, when I experience culinary pleasure, I assess the dish

that I am eating as good. On the other hand, if I experience a painful burning sensation upon tasting a very hot curry dish, I might describe the dish as bad.

Before we proceed with this discussion I wish to address the notion of 'pleasure' and 'pain'. I can readily recognize the meaning of "pain" as in the sensations associated with a toothache, or a prick of a pin. I can also recognize the meaning of "pleasure" in conjunction with sundry instances of my experience. However, there is a host of subtle sensations that prompt me to utter a value judgement, that I would not normally classify as neither 'pleasurable', nor 'painful'. Such sensations can be discerned from the meaning of the words "agreeable" and "disagreeable" for example. In order to cover the different shades, degrees, and opposite varieties of these sensations for the purposes of discussion, I will classify them under the nonspecific designations of "positive feelings", and "negative feelings". In general, '***positive***' and '***negative*** feelings' -and not necessarily 'pleasure' and 'pain'- give rise respectively to the pronouncement of 'positive' and 'negative tertiary qualities'.

At this juncture, I would like to point out a particular difference between primary and secondary qualities on the one hand, and tertiary qualities on the other. In the case of primary and secondary qualities, perception can lead me to the pronouncement of attributes such as "round", and "red" in describing the object that I perceive. However, if the object I perceive is an item of food, I do not proceed to eat it by virtue of its roundness or redness. On the other hand, I seek and eat whatever item of food I deem to be good, and avoid any item that I consider bad. Returning to the culinary example, where I taste a dish: if I experience culinary pleasure, I assess the dish as ***good***, ***and proceed to eat it***, if on the other hand I experience a painful burning sensation, I assess the dish as ***bad***, ***and refrain from eating it***. The experience of pleasure and pain, and a host of positive and negative feelings may lead to uttering a value judgement, i.e. a tertiary quality in the case of an object. In the first place however, ***valuation involves a propensity for action to pursue or to avoid the object***. Action results more often from the experience of 'pleasure' or 'pain', without verbalization of a 'value judgement'.

The 'Origins' of 'Pleasure' and 'Pain' as the 'Motors' of Action

The relationship between pleasure and pain, valuation, and action, has been explained in an evolutionary context. Herbert Spencer was the first to provide this explanation in the "Principles of Psychology" (D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1887).

Spencer points out that we seek the pleasurable and avoid the painful, and that pleasure and pain accordingly influence the ways we act. He then raises the question: what could have happened if mutations in the course of evolution had led to the creation of a form of life which derives pleasure from the experience of being burned by fire, and thus, would have pursued the activity of getting burned? Or alternatively, if a form of life experiences pain when it consumes nutriment that is necessary for it's survival, and thus, would have avoided taking nourishment? His answer, in both cases, is that such forms of life would have perished. The forms that survive therefore, would be those that reflect an 'appropriate', or "the fittest", correlation between pleasure and pain, and what is 'conducive', and what is 'detrimental' to survival respectively. Spencer thus, in a way, proposes that ***pleasure and pain are the motors of action in evolution***. They drive a life form to do certain things, and inhibit it from doing others, in order to survive; until such time that is, when changes in the environment require different correlation between pleasure and pain and particular activities,

which the "fittest" set of mutations would provide.

I was, and am still sympathetic to Spencer's views, although what he says may be considered by some as 'tautological'. I also accept the statement that "I tend to seek whatever gives me pleasure or positive feelings, and I tend to avoid whatever gives me pain or negative feelings". However, I am not certain all the time whether my action following this proviso will be conducive or detrimental to my survival. In fact there are numerous instances where I think that my action was detrimental to my health and thus to my survival.

The explanation which evolutionists provide for this condition relates to the growth of complexity of the human organism, to the extent of human power through intelligence to manipulate the human predicament, and to the accelerating pace at which humans have altered their environment. Mutation can no longer provide fitter humans at a rate that keeps pace with the fast rate of change in the environment that is being caused by humans. In addition, we are able now to deliberately seek 'the survival of all' through medicine, and thus have interfered with the processes involved in 'the survival of the fittest'. Our 'success' might have emancipated us from the influence of numerous harsh conditions affecting survival. However, this has led to distortions in the effectiveness of pleasure and pain in guiding our action.

Tertiary Qualities, 'Pleasure' and 'Pain', Valuation, and Action in the Physiological Idealist Model

The notion of the involvement of pleasure and pain, and positive and negative feelings in value judgement, and in motivating action, can be understood from introspection, i.e. from consideration of one's own experience, as I have indicated above. The notion can be illustrated also in the physiological idealist model of perception.

When we considered perception earlier, we stopped at the juncture where a subject perceives an object at the time that, or immediately after, certain activities take place in the visual areas of his cerebral cortex. Presumably the subject would have perceived what I classified as primary and secondary qualities of an object at this juncture. The subject might subsequently make a pronouncement regarding a tertiary quality of the object which he has just perceived. This may be followed by action to pursue or to avoid the object. To explain the latter events the physiological idealist would explain how a subject generally acts.

He would point out that the subject's nervous system contains afferent as well as efferent nerves; the former conduct impulses from receptors to the brain such as in the case of perception, and the latter conduct impulses from the brain to the muscles and glands thus effecting action. In certain cases, such as a knee jerk caused by the doctor's mallet, the action -or reflex- of the subject may not involve the brain; the connection between afferent and efferent impulses may take place via certain nerve ganglia of the nervous system at lower levels than the brain. In most cases however the brain would be involved in completing the circuit between afferent and efferent impulses. The completion of the circuit in the brain that leads to action can involve activities of various degrees of intensity in many parts of the brain, and may occur over varying spans of time. The action that results is exemplified in all facets of human behavior including speech.

As to valuation and the associated action, the physiological idealist would indicate that he is able to

explain what happens in the case of the experience of pain. He can correlate pain, the expression of pain, and the action of the subject to withdraw from an object that causes pain, with particular areas of the brain and nervous system that have been already mapped. The experience of pleasure, and subtle positive and negative feelings, appears to result from more diffuse and varied activities of the brain that he is striving to understand. Continuing investigation will lead to ever more detailed explanation of human behavior in neurological terms. He would, for the time being however, refer us to the psychologist for further explanation of behavior.

The physiological idealist would add however, that ***pleasure and pain, and all shades and degrees of positive and negative feelings which give rise to value judgement and to action are fabricated in the subject's brain***. ***They do not exist in the outside world and would not exist in the absence of a subject***. He would also reiterate his explanation of how values, like colors and other sense data, are projected by the subject to the outside world. His explanation illustrates the notion that '***valuation is subjective***'.

Pleasure and Pain, Valuation and Action in Psychology

We have considered the role of 'pleasure' and 'pain', and 'valuation' in relation to 'tertiary qualities of objects', and the related action of the subject in pursuing or avoiding an 'object'. 'Subjective valuation' however does not occur only in relation to 'objects', it seems to apply in almost all facets of behavior. Most notably, it occurs also with respect to ***ideas***, i.e. abstractions, and imagined conditions. This can be discerned in the pronouncements "good idea", and "bad idea", which carry the propensity to accept a 'good idea', and to reject a 'bad idea'. I would like now to expand the discussion of 'valuation' as it applies to behavior in general.

Psychologists generally confirm the role of 'pleasure' and 'pain', and a host of related 'positive' and 'negative' sensations and emotions, in effecting behavior. Action may result from the experience of 'pleasure' or 'pain', such as when I experience 'pain' and withdraw my hand from fire. However, in the case of humans, 'valuation' and action usually involve imagined ideas. Desire, or the 'contemplation of potential pleasure', and fear, or the 'contemplation of potential pain', influence action as in "fight or flight". The influence of such sensations and emotions is recognized in the statements: "need is the mother of invention" and, "fear breeds aggression". Furthermore, action by humans does not result always from direct responses to 'positive' and 'negative' sensations. It may result from contemplating and 'weighing' the potential for experiencing degrees of 'positive feelings', and selecting the course that promises more 'positive' feelings. Action may also result from contemplating and 'weighing' the potential for experiencing degrees of 'negative feelings', and selecting the course that promises less 'negative feelings'. Sometimes the 'negative' has to be endured in order to attain the 'positive', and action is pursued accordingly. Generally, 'valuation' in the case of humans aims at minimizing the potential for experiencing 'negative feelings', and maximizing the potential for experiencing 'positive feelings', in the immediate and long term future. The processes of 'valuation' usually involve the ***imagination*** of options for action. The 'valuation' of the imagined options leading to the development of '***preference***' and to action. This phenomenon can be discerned from the words "better" and "best", and "worse" and "worst", and the tendency to pursue the 'best' course for action, and to avoid the 'worst'.

Now, the psychologist indicates that the processes of 'valuation' depend on two main factors:

mental constitution, and environmental conditioning. Mental constitution relates to inherited traits, such as the propensity of being manic-depressive for example. Environmental conditioning relates to individual experience, where connections between events and 'positive' and 'negative feelings' are established through 'Pavlovian' association. Mental constitution, and established associations, both conscious and subconscious, affect the experience of 'positive' and 'negative feelings', i.e. 'valuation'. Thus they influence the development of 'preference' and action. Controversy prevails regarding the relative impacts of "nature" and "nurture" on human behavior; a matter that I do not wish to take a position on. What concerns me is that human beings are neither identical in "nature", nor in "nurture". When different 'subjects' are involved in the 'valuation' of an 'object', or an idea, there is a chance that their 'valuations' may differ. A 'valuation' process takes place in the brain -or mind- of each 'subject'. Since the nature and the experience of each 'subject' are unique, there is a chance that 'valuations' by different subjects will not be identical. This illustrates the notion that '***valuation is subjective and potentially variable***', and explains the incidence of disagreement in 'valuation' by different individuals.

The notion of the dynamic and variable nature of 'valuation' can be confirmed from introspection. I can play 'the same piece of music' at different times, and my appreciation of it could vary depending on my mood; i.e. the state of my mind each time I listen to it. Since I am constantly gaining more experience as I continue to live, there is also a chance that my associations involving 'pleasure' and 'pain' could be modified in the process. Such modifications occur, and affect my assessments, as in the cases where I "change my mind" about the 'value' of an 'object', or my 'preference' for pursuing a course of action.

The incidence of disagreement can be also related to the extent of the proliferation of imagined options. Comparison with other organisms may highlight the extent to which the contemplation of options for action has grown in the case of humans. The ameba's action is probably limited to a few reflexes. The lion may contemplate hunting a gazelle versus hunting a buffalo. I, on the other hand can contemplate eating fish, chicken, or meat, and I can go further to consider boiling, grilling, or frying my food, and so on. ***Every step of my action***, I would like to stress, could involve the imagination of options, 'valuation', and the establishment of 'preference' leading to my acting one way or another. The 'vast' capacity of human imagination, combined with the 'fact' that each human being is unique and different in some ways from any other, further explain the proliferation of options for different courses for action, and the concomitant expansion of the potential for disagreement among humans.

The Prevalence of 'Subjective Variable Valuation' in Different Types of Behavior

I have already mentioned the case of a knee jerk, or involuntary reflex, which does not necessarily involve the brain. I do not consider such reflexes as involving 'value judgement' and 'preference'. All other facets of behavior however can be construed as involving 'some measure' of 'valuation'. The relative extent of the involvement of 'subjective and potentially variable valuation' can be discerned through consideration of selected examples of human behavior. I will start with examples from what is often referred to in philosophy as "every day experience".

If I witness a crime, the feelings I experience are likely to 'prompt' me to report the crime I witnessed to the police; an act that can be considered as resulting from a 'value judgement'. I may relate, and swear to the 'truth' of what I saw in a court of law. I would have had the choice to lie,

but once I 'opt' to tell the 'truth', a decision involving a 'value judgement' on my part, I no longer ***select*** the 'truth' that I would relate. It has been given and vividly recorded in my memory; the crime was committed in daytime, I had my glasses on, and was close to the seen of the crime. If others lie about the event, I would be able to establish that by comparing their statements with my memory of what I have seen. Accordingly, at least in every day common sense, telling the 'truth', and establishing 'truth' from 'falsehood' in certain cases, is a matter that may not involve 'subjective variable valuation' and 'preference'. In such cases, different 'truthful' witnesses may describe events in different words, but their statements will agree 'in essence'. The statements of the different witnesses in such cases may be referred to as 'objective'. I would still prefer to refer to the statements as 'subjective', since they emanate from different subjects, and at least, involve the '***choice***' of words to describe events.

In the lack of witnesses, the police would normally attempt to collect 'evidence' to identify and convict a criminal. The police investigation would involve 'value judgements' by all those involved in carrying it out. However, if 'hard evidence' such as fingerprints can be found that implicates a particular person, all involved would agree about convicting the criminal. The definition of "hard" evidence involves 'value judgement'. Fingerprints for example were not considered as 'hard' evidence until recently. However, once what constitutes 'hard' evidence has been defined and accepted, the discovery of 'hard' evidence would leave no options for those involved to 'validate' and to possibly disagree about, and would normally lead to the conviction of the criminal.

The majority of cases however involve a 'measure' of doubt in establishing 'truth'. In these 'gray' cases, 'subjective variable value judgement' returns, 'by necessity', as the 'method' of reaching decisions and action. Recognition of the involvement of 'subjective variable valuation' in such 'gray' cases can be considered as 'the raison d'etre' for lawyers, '***jury***' panels, and '***judges***', whose job is to establish 'truth' "beyond '***reasonable***' doubt".

Certain instances of everyday behavior seem not to involve 'value judgement' and preference. Action "by force of habit" for example, does not involve 'preference' and 'selection', at the time when action occurs. However, the establishment of habits in the first place involves 'valuation', and the development of 'preference' for the course of action that eventually becomes habitual. Behavior resulting from indoctrination can be considered in a similar way. Once indoctrinated I act according to the 'dictates of doctrine' without necessarily considering options for action. The process of indoctrination however involves "the carrot and the stick", i.e. the promise of 'reward' or potential 'pleasure', and the threat of 'punishment' or potential 'pain'. Accordingly, 'valuation' is initially involved in establishing habits, as well as in indoctrination. Consequently, behavior results from pre-established connections in the brain, without necessarily involving 'valuation'.

One last example from everyday experience reflects a particular facet of human behavior. If I am seriously ill, the doctor might prescribe broth, and nothing else but broth. In this case I am likely to abide by his advice. I would probably refrain from considering any options, such as eating hamburger or ice cream. I would feel confident that I made the 'right' decision because my survival is at stake. Others would probably agree that I made the 'right' decision, and would abide by the doctor's advice under similar circumstances. Also, when a person is seriously ill, a majority of people would select the option of seeking medical help, rather than ignore the situation. Higher degrees of agreement seem to be likely to occur in instances of 'valuation' and action that relate to the survival of an individual or the species.

Now, there is more to what is referred to in philosophy as "every day experience". For example, philosophizing itself is an every day experience of philosophers, and so is scientific investigation to scientist, and designing to engineers and architects, and so on. I will start by addressing the case of logicians whose work a lay person may consider as not involving 'valuation'.

Logic and all its branches involve the definition of premises. The fact that logicians and mathematicians do sometimes disagree about the definition of premises indicates the involvement of 'value judgement' and preference in the field. Once premises have been defined and agreed to however, the operations that follow are universally accepted. Logic has been indicated as reflecting 'the laws of thought'; if certain premises are accepted, we ***can not help but think*** in certain ways that follow from the acceptance of the established premises. Once a theory of numbers has been established, for example, 'positive' and 'negative feelings' and 'preference' no longer affect the activities of addition and multiplication. While carrying out such operations, I act like a computer that has no 'feelings', neither 'positive', nor 'negative'.

Science employs particular methods which attempt to combine the 'the laws of thought', i.e. logic and mathematics, with the observation of what may be considered as 'evidence'. Scientists usually do not indicate that they are in the business of finding the 'truth about the world' however. They form ***hypotheses*** about the occurrence of events in the 'world' -or universe- and attempt to 'validate' there hypotheses through observation. They constantly modify their hypotheses to more closely correspond with observed phenomena. They ***quantify*** phenomena through the definition of units of measurement, and predict future events with ever increasing accuracy. A scientist might experience sensations of elation ***after*** observing the movement of a dial which 'supports' a hypothesis that he had conceived. The act of observing the dial however, involves only 'primary' and 'secondary qualities of objects'; the 'appropriate' dial reading triggers subsequent elation. Science in a way attempts to avoid the experience of 'tertiary qualities' at the moment of empirical observation. Scientific method which combines empiricism and 'the laws of thought', has led to relatively less disagreement in science compared with many other fields of human endeavor.

In philosophy on the other hand, most philosophers would maintain that their main quest is to discover the 'truth about the word'. However, while the consideration of observed phenomena and the utilization of 'the laws of thought' are usually involved in philosophy, observed phenomena are cited, and logical steps are commonly used in philosophical discourse to reach diametrically opposing views. Furthermore, the subject matter of philosophy, by most philosophers' account, involves topics where 'truth' and 'falsehood' can not be 'ascertained', and where there is even no 'hope' for finding 'evidence' to 'support' one philosophical statement over another. Such is the case I would point out, with statements regarding the 'status' of 'color' in the 'world'.

The examples of behavior that we have discussed can be generally considered as involving two components. One component relating to 'knowing', and the other relating to employing knowledge towards action for some purpose. I would consider the event of witnessing a crime as representative of the first component, and the act of telling the 'truth' in a court of law as representative of the second. The first component of 'passive' perception I do not consider as involving 'valuation'. The second component that relates to action almost all ways does. Logic, science, and philosophy may be considered as belonging to the category of 'knowing' or perhaps 'attempting to know'. However, they involve an element of '***choice***' in thought, at least with respect to the selection and definition of premises, which to me is indicative of the involvement of 'subjective and potentially variable valuation'. On the other hand there are disciplines which are '***geared***' towards action such

as engineering and architecture for example. These disciplines, by definition, allways involve 'subjective and potentially variable valuation'. This is in line with the evolutionary explanation of the 'evolvement' of 'valuation' to guide action.

Summation

The above considerations led me to believe that 'subjective and potentially variable valuation' is involved in all facets of human behavior, except perhaps in certain types of reflexes, and in certain instances of 'mental logical ***operations***'. ***The notion that*** '***valuation***' ***can vary between different individuals***, ***and the same individual at different times***, ***explains the incidence of disagreement***. The probability for agreement/disagreement by different individuals varies depending on the subject matter of 'valuation'. It could range from full agreement, to disagreement among all involved. It appeared to me that higher degrees of agreement relate to survival. 'Beauty in architecture' did not appear to me as 'closely related to survival'. This provided the answer to my query regarding the main issue that preoccupied me at the time I was writing my thesis, namely, it provided an explanation of how different people disagree in assessing 'value' in the field of architecture. This may be considered as a 'simple common sense conclusion'. However, ***consistent adherence to the views inherent in this conclusion***, ***and in particular the notion that*** '***value does not reside in the objects of the physical world***, ***but rather in the brain or mind of the subject***', ***can lead to*** '***serious consequences***'. The 'consequences' in my own case will be revealed as my tale unfolds.

Chapter 2 CONSEQUENCES OF RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY

Foreword

I introduced in the previous chapter some of the main views that I encountered in philosophy, and indicated how certain views influenced my thinking. I would like now to recap the development of my thoughts, and to articulate the consequences of my research in philosophy.

Believing what I expressed in the previous chapter led me to a position that could be considered a variant of what is referred to in philosophy as "General Relativism". Adopting general relativism in turn impacted my views and attitudes, as I will explain next.

Adoption of General Relativism

My research in philosophy exposed me to discussions of perception. In philosophy, perception is commonly addressed in conjunction with epistemology, or theory of knowledge, in an effort to establish 'the possibility, or ***validity*** of our knowledge of the world through perception'. Generally, epistemological investigations have led to skepticism about 'our knowledge of the world through perception'. Some even led to skepticism about 'existence', and to concepts such as 'Cartesian doubt', and the related statement "I think, therefore I am". In spite of my 'admiration' of the 'motives' for pursuing epistemology, my reading on perception and related topics did not shake my confidence in 'my existence'. Albeit, I came out of my journey in philosophy thinking that 'I' could be considered as 'an abstraction from interrupted streams of consciousness', and that 'I' is constantly changing.

The arguments of philosophers did not either lead me to doubt the existence of 'a world out there', a 'world' that is full of 'objects', and 'living entities', including other people similar to myself. The 'world' will continue to exist whether I am there to perceive it or not.

The realist and the idealist appeared to me to agree that, irrespective of what 'stuff' the 'world' is made of, spatial relationships in the 'world', i.e. 'primary qualities', are 'represented' in perception. Representation depends on the point of view of the perceiver, as in the cases where I perceive a circle as a circle, or as an ellipse. I subscribed to this notion.

The realist however, maintained that 'color', and other similar 'qualities of an object', i.e. 'secondary qualities', are part of the 'stuff' of the 'outside world', and that they would exist when no one is there to perceive them. When different people look at an 'object' they perceive 'the color ***of the*** object in the world which is common to all of us'. Their percepts of 'the color of the object' are similar. The percepts differ only in ways relating to the respective points of view of the different perceivers. The idealist on the other hand, maintained that what gives rise to the perception of 'color' and other 'sense data' is an activity fabricated in the brain of each individual perceiver. He also gave an account of how the activities in the brain are 'projected' by the perceiver to 'the outside world'. According to the idealist, 'colors' would not exist in the absence of a perceiver. Furthermore, when different people look at an 'object', a unique and separate 'perceptual

representation' of the 'object' is 'fabricated' in the brain of each perceiver. For all we know the 'colors' in the different 'perceptual representations' may be radically different. We can not see 'objects' through the eyes of others to settle this issue. My position in this respect started initially by siding fully with the idealist's statements, but my conviction grew somewhat weaker with time.

Ultimately, while recognizing the concerns of epistemology in addressing perception, I ascribed no 'practical value' from a lay perspective to the settlement of the 'issue' of 'the status of color in the world'. When I ask someone to hand me a 'red apple', I usually get a 'red apple', and not a 'green one', unless the person I ask is 'color blind'. Whatever difference exists in our sense data relating to 'color', if any, does not seem to 'seriously' impact our communication about the 'color' of an 'object'. The relation between the perceived 'color' and the word used to designate the 'color', which is formed by association in the process of learning language, does not lead to the kinds and degrees of disagreement that are involved in communicating about the 'value', or 'tertiary quality' of an 'object'.

The aesthetic 'absolutist' indicated that 'values', or 'tertiary qualities', are intrinsic to the 'objects' of the 'world', and that we can perceive 'value' directly as in the case of 'beauty' in 'aesthetic perception'. He admits however, that unlike the case of 'color', where different people usually agree about the 'color' of the 'object' that they perceive, in the case of 'value', people disagree more often about the 'intrinsic value' of the 'object'. The 'absolutist' ascribes this disagreement to the 'astuteness' of those who perceive the 'true value' of the 'object', and to the 'ignorance' or 'insensitivity' of those who do not; he would probably nominate himself, or some other 'expert', as the 'arbiter' of who is 'astute', and who is not. Conditions relating to disagreement he would add, can be 'rectified' through 'appropriate' education of those who do not 'properly' perceive 'value'. The relativist on the other hand indicated that different subjects could look at an 'object' from the 'same point of view' and still pronounce different 'value judgements' about the 'object'. He does not discern changes in the 'object' that can be correlated with the subjects' differing 'value judgements', and unlike the case of 'primary' and 'secondary qualities', he is unable to correlate 'value' with specific counterparts in the 'outside world'. On the other hand he can conceive that the experience of 'value' results from activities in the areas correlated with 'pleasure' and 'pain' in the brains of the different perceivers which are not identical. Therefore, he indicated that differences in 'valuation' have to be related to differences in the observers, i.e. the ***subjects***, not the 'objects', and concluded that '***valuation is subjective***'. The relativist reiterated his explanation of how the sensations that give rise to the experience of 'value' are 'projected' to the 'outside world'. In the absence of a perceiver, 'values' would not exist. There are no 'values' in 'the world out there' for people to disagree about. Disagreement about 'value' arises in communication, when different individuals 'project' different 'subjective' experiences of 'value' to 'the outside world'. Th relativist added that disagreement in communication could be avoided, if people recognized that they are 'projecting' their different 'subjective' experiences of 'value' to the 'outside world'. My position regarding 'value judgement' was strongly on the side of the relativist. In addition, I felt that the resolution of the conflict between the 'absolutist' and the relativist with respect to 'valuation' could have more 'practical implications' than resolving the 'issues' regarding the 'status' of color in the 'world'.

The evolutionist psychologist explained that 'pleasure' and 'pain', and 'positive' and 'negative feelings' in general are 'added' to 'row sense data', i.e. 'primary' and 'secondary qualities', in the brain of the perceiver as 'valuation tools' to guide his action. The processes of 'valuation' started as simple and effective mechanisms to guide action. They tended to occur in similar ways in the

brains of the surviving members of a species. However, with increased complexity of the human brain, and increased interference with the environment and with human conditions, the processes of 'valuation' are tending to vary among different people. In addition, 'valuation' may be losing some of its 'effectiveness' in guiding action in the case of humans. I believed the evolutionist explanation.

Psychologists generally confirmed that the experience of 'value' is the 'force' underlying 'action'. The experience of 'pleasure' and 'pain' and sundry related sensations and emotions appear to "bread" action. Action may be the utterance of a 'value judgement', or may be physical action, such as 'fight', or 'flight', leading to war, or peace. I sided with these views, which I felt are confirmed through introspection in contemplating my own action.

Psychologists also pointed out that the experience of 'value' depends both on the constitution and the past experience of each individual. There are similarities in the constitution and experience of different individuals. However, the chemistry and the neural connections in the brain of each individual are unique. This gives rise to sometimes similar, but always unique experiences of 'value'. This condition applies in the case of the same individual at different times, since each of us is constantly changing. This confirmed my belief that '***valuation is subjective and potentially variable***'.

Adopting the kinds of views cited above regarding 'valuation' reinforced my belief in aesthetic relativism, and in it's explanation of the phenomenon of disagreement in 'assessment'. I became a confirmed 'aesthetic relativist'. Furthermore, the views expanded my belief to include all types of 'assessment', 'aesthetic' or otherwise, as 'subjective and potentially variable', and led me to formulate a particular position regarding the incidence of disagreement in all facets of human behavior. The position I adopted can be considered as an extension of the views inherent in idealism. It is referred to in philosophy as "relativism" or "subjectivism". I prefer the term "relativism". The position has been maintained separately with respect to different philosophical topics, including aesthetics, ethics, and theory of knowledge. I sympathized with all forms of relativism, albeit with some qualification.

The first step in expanding my relativistic views related to expanding my belief in the involvement of 'subjective and variable value judgement' that started initially with respect to 'aesthetic beauty'. I came to believe that the assessment of all kinds of objects, not only the 'objects' and 'products' of the 'fine arts', involve 'subjective and potentially variable value judgement'. For example, I thought that 'subjective valuation' applies with respect to 'functional' as well as 'aesthetic aspects of objects'. A tall person and a short person may disagree in their 'assessment' of whether a chair is 'comfortable'. Two short persons with different physical constitution may also disagree in 'assessing' whether a chair is 'comfortable'. The 'chair' in 'the outside world' is neither 'comfortable' nor 'uncomfortable'. 'Assessments' of 'functionality', like the 'assessments' of 'beauty' result from the experience of 'positive' and 'negative feelings' which are 'subjective and variable'. Different degrees of probability for agreement/disagreement regarding 'beauty' vs. 'functionality' may be contemplated, but that is a different 'issue'.

The next expansion of my relativistic approach related to taking the step of extending consideration of the applicability of 'subjective variable valuation' from the case of 'objects' to the case of ideas and concepts. I will relate some of the conclusions that readily followed from my relativistic stance.

In ethics, opposing views can be classified as variants of "Moral Realism", and "Moral Relativism"; I am tempted to refer to "Moral Realism" as "Moral Absolutism" but will not do so, and will proceed within the confines of recognized terminology. A variant of the first position asserts that 'moral values' exist in the 'world' irrespective of the existence of humans. Plato made this assertion, and considered 'moral norms', 'beauty', and mathematical relations such as 1+1=2 as reflecting 'universal forms' that are timeless, and inherent to the universe. The second position relates 'moral norms' to human convention. From the physiological idealist perspective that I adopted, 'moral norms' and statements relate to brain activities. There is no indication of the presence of 'morality' outside the subject's brain. In addition, even the 'most solemn' of moral norms: "thau shalt not kill another human", has not been universally adopted. Killing other humans for 'good' reason has not been uncommon, even in the name of religion. The doctrine of "Just War" in ethics defends the position of killing other humans for 'good reason'. My conclusion therefore, was to reject moral realism, and to readily adopt moral relativism. Believing as I did in the relativity of 'valuation' and 'value judgement' of all sorts, I considered the words "right" and "wrong" in the moral context, to be of similar nature to the words "beautiful" and "ugly" in the aesthetic context. I thought, 'right' and 'wrong' also depend on 'value judgement' which is 'subjective and variable'. Different degrees of probability for agreement/disagreement regarding 'beauty' vs. 'morality' may be contemplated. That, again, is a different 'issue'.

In epistemology, it can be generally said that philosophers with realist inclination would tend to adopt "Cognitive Realism", while those with idealist inclination would tend to adopt "Cognitive Relativism". Different philosophers have expounded variants of both types of position. I came to believe a 'qualified' version of cognitive relativism; cognitive relativism by the way appears to be more widely adopted among philosophers at present.

Two main topics are commonly involved in epistemological discussions: "knowledge", and "rationality". The subject of 'the validity of knowledge' was not of main concern at the time I was writing my thesis, the subject of 'rationality' however materialized as a central theme in the development of my thoughts.

Starting with 'knowledge', it can be said that it is 'relative' and 'subjective' if considered dependant on our particular human constitution compared with other known or unknown forms of intelligence; i.e. it may be considered as 'relative' to the human species. 'Knowledge' may be also considered as 'relative' to different cultures. I understood and 'sympathized' with these propositions. However, I came to differentiate 'knowledge' through direct perception from other types of 'knowledge' such as through scientific and philosophical 'investigation'.

From my lay perspective, I did not ascribe 'value' to assuming a 'theoretical' position regarding 'the validity of our knowledge of the world through perception'. I assumed the 'common sense' position that 'normal' human perception can be considered to yield 'knowledge', or rather 'information' about the 'outside world'. 'Knowledge' through perception may not be all ways 'reliable'. For example, I may see a 'star' in the sky and think that it still exists. Science tells me however, that I see what the 'star' used to be millions or billions of years ago. The 'star' may have imploded or exploded sometime during the period of time that took light emanating from the 'star' to reach my eyes. Also, experiencing a 'mirage' may lead me to think that 'water' exists where it actually does not. At shorter distances however, perception gives me information about a 'moving car' that leads me to avoid getting run over, or the presence of a hard 'object' that I avoid bumping

into. I tend to believe and act according to the information I receive through perception, whether what I am aware of in perception is considered 'real' or 'representative' and 'relative' to my senses of perception. My position regarding other types of 'knowledge' is derived from considerations relating to 'rationality'.

'Rationality' implies 'reasoning', a subject that I think is 'intimately' related to considerations of 'the validity of knowledge'. My position in this respect developed as follows. I believe that: 'knowledge of the world in passive perception does not involve reasoning'. 'Information' about the 'world', whether 'valid' or not, is 'given' in perception. I believe also that: 'knowledge of the world through both scientific and philosophical investigation involves reasoning'. 'Reasoning' is often defined as giving one's 'reasons' as to 'why' one believes a certain proposition. Asking the question 'why?' however can theoretically lead to an endless regression. Children some times demonstrate the potential for an endless regression when they continue to repeat the question "why?" after each time they have been given a 'reason' in answer to 'why?' in a series starting from their initial query. In practice the regression may stop through recrimination by an impatient parent. Alternatively, in the cases of children as well as adults, the regression could stop if those involved in discussion can find "common grounds"; i.e. some propositions that they accept, and upon which they can proceed logically to reach a conclusion. Finding common grounds may or may not materialize however, depending on the subject of discussion and the respective inclinations of the participants. For example, some may agree to accept the classical deduction: "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal". Others however could contest the premises involved in this deduction. They could maintain that men have 'bodies' and 'soles', 'bodies' may perish, but soles are 'immortal'. The ensuing debate could conceivably go on 'for ever'. Aristotle came to this realization and proposed 'first principles' as a means to stop the 'regress of reasons'. He hoped that 'first principles' could be arrived at through induction, i.e. generalization from particular events, a method that is employed in science. Induction in turn involves 'issues' relating to the '***validity***' of the concept of 'probability'. Philosophers are still debating Aristotle's proposal. My conviction therefore was that since 'first principles' are 'debatable', the 'validity of knowledge can not be proven'. In spite of that, I consider science as providing 'knowledge' or rather 'information' about the 'world'. I generally tend to believe in science because it strives to provide 'reasons to support its hypotheses, ***in the form of observational evidence that all can see***'. It also provides accurate predictions that usually come true. Therefore, although I do not necessarily believe all scientists all the time, I tend to consider what scientists say when I contemplate options for action.

Philosophy on the other hand, by philosopher's account, is not concerned with 'observational evidence'. Many philosophers maintain that if 'observational evidence' can be found to 'support' a philosophical proposition, then the subject matter would shift to the realm of scientific investigation, leaving the residual of 'unsubstantiated' matters in the realm of philosophy. I therefore consider philosophy to provide 'hypotheses' rather than 'knowledge' about the 'world', and hesitate more often about what to believe and what not to believe in philosophy. I suspect that my hesitation relates to the common notion that philosophers 'can not provide evidence to support any of their different hypotheses', as well as to the prevalence of diametrically opposing 'hypotheses' in philosophy. Still, I do sometimes develop preferences in adopting one philosophical 'hypothesis' rather than another. The position I elect to adopt in turn influences various facets of my behavior. I will explain how this happens shortly.

Last but not least, I believed that all facets of behavior that are 'geared' towards the 'utilization' of

'knowledge' towards action, including engineering and architecture, do involve the application of 'subjective and variable valuation', and accordingly, that action of all sorts could be conceivably 'debated'. Actually I believed, and still do believe the following propositions regarding action. Action resulting from 'knowledge through direct perception' would involve 'one round of valuation' that provides direction to the use of the information that is 'given' in perception towards action. Action based on other types of 'knowledge', or rather 'hypotheses', involves 'two rounds of valuation'. The first 'round' relating to the 'assessment of a given hypothesis' as in science and philosophy, and the 'second round' involving the 'use of the assessed hypothesis'.

My excursion in philosophy led me to adopt the qualified general relativistic position that I expressed above. The position in turn influenced my attitudes and behavior. The influence related to my attitude in adopting the relativistic position itself and to practical day to day matters.

Consistent Adoption of General Relativism

I consider the 'issues' that I will attempt to address next to 'lie at the heart of philosophical thought, and to involve recognized logical paradoxes, and circular thinking'. I never counted on getting involved in addressing these 'issues' when I started to work on my thesis, but circumstances led me to contend with them. I will explain how my involvement came about, and express some of my own 'circular thinking' in respect of the subject matter.

My involvement came about when, at some point during the period that I was working on my thesis, I realized that the subject matter of the thesis mainly addresses philosophical 'issues'. At that time, I also believed the statements that "philosophical positions ***can not*** be proven", and that "evidence ***can not*** be presented in support of any philosophical position". As I mentioned earlier, these conditions led me to question my attitude in making assertive statements with respect to the subject matter of my thesis. I debated statements such as those that I have just cited, and statements regarding idealism and relativism in general. My overall position appeared to involve an 'inconsistency'.

As I mentioned earlier, the first thought that occurred to me in the way of resolving this 'inconsistency' was ***not*** to consider the philosophical positions that I happen to hold as reflecting '***matters of fact***'. I decided to hold philosophical positions rather as '***beliefs***'. I decided to predicate propositions such as that "the qualities of objects ***are*** mental and ***can not*** exist in the outside world" with a statement suggested by Bertrand Russell, namely: "***I, now, tend to believe the proposition (p)***". I contemplated also the following thoughts with respect to my 'beliefs'.

As far as physiological idealism is concerned, my 'belief' in it was initiated through my exposure to the 'arguments' that cite the processes involved in perception. At the time I was exposed to these arguments, I found it difficult to conceive how the myriad of 'qualities of objects experienced in perception' can, if they existed in 'the outside world', travel through similar afferent nerves, and 'pop up' in the subject's percepts. Therefore, I sided with the view that 'qualities are ***fabricated*** in the subject's brain -or mind'. On the other hand however, as many realist philosophers have pointed out, the description of 'the processes involved in perception' is presented by science whose 'vocabulary' does not include in the first place 'colors' or 'sounds', but includes 'light waves' and 'sound waves' instead. The absence of the 'colors' and 'sounds' experienced in perception in the

scientific explanation of perception may relate to the particular 'scientific vocabulary' of describing events. I addressed this topic in my thesis, and as I did so, my belief in physiological idealism started to 'waver'. At that time I pondered also the question: can I establish the presence or non-presence of colors in the ***absence*** of a perceiver? My answer was "No". In the lack of such 'evidence', I asked myself, how could I remain 'sympathetic' to idealism? In pondering possible answers to this question, I was unable to conceive of any way that could have led me to be 'sympathetic' with idealism, other than 'my own subjective and variable valuation' of the 'arguments' that I happened to encounter in my research. Introspection tended to confirm this possible answer, since the degree of my belief in idealism actually had fluctuated somewhat over the years as I contemplated 'opposing' arguments on the subject of perception.

This provides the answer to the question I raised earlier in the previous chapter, about ***how*** I remained ***sympathetic*** to physiological idealism in spite of my thinking that it 'can not be proven'.

Events over the years tended to reinforce my feelings about idealism. Recent developments in particle physics that have materialized after the time I was engaged in writing my thesis, talk about 'fermions', 'bosons', 'Higgs particles', 'muons', 'gluons', top and bottom 'quarks', and 'photons'. 'Matter' is being 'broken down' to ever more 'ethereal' components, and 'matter' and 'energy' are being considered 'interchangeably'. 'Brains' and 'nervous systems' can be thought of as 'made up of the components described in physics'. At present, it is relatively easier for me to conceive that 'mind is made up of matter', as 'matter' is being described by physics today. It is also relatively easier for me to contemplate the notion that 'mental colors and sounds may be part of the physical world that is common to all of us, and that they might be carried through afferent nerves to particular destinations in the brain'. However, I intuitively still ***tend to believe*** that 'colors do not exist outside brains'. At any rate, I have reached a conclusion that I have adhered to for many years now, namely, I decided to suspend taking a position regarding the 'hypotheses' that concern 'the status of secondary qualities in the world'. Before I leave this subject however, I wish to admit that believing in idealism helped to shake my instinctive confidence that 'the objects that I am aware of in perception are common to others'. This paved the way for me to think that 'the values that I experience in perception do not reside in the outside world, and that they may not be common to others'. This reinforced my belief in relativism.

I contemplated similar considerations with respect to relativism as I did with respect to idealism. Recent developments in genetics indicate that behavior may be preprogrammed to a 'large extent' in our genes. The programs could be conceivably related backward to the 'big bang'; yet another recently developed theory. Some may maintain that Plato was 'correct' in his assertion about the 'universal forms', and that 'Platonic forms exist outside human experience and are ***carried through*** to humans by way of specific genetic programs'. I raised the question: can I find any 'evidence' to 'support' any position that I might happen to adopt in this respect? My answer, at least to date, is "No". Accordingly, ***I could have considered suspending taking a position with respect to any views regarding valuation, as I did with respect to 'the status of secondary qualities'. However, I have not succeeded in doing this***.

On the one hand, the notion that people may differ in 'assessment' can be established ***empirically***. The extent of agreement and disagreement regarding particular 'issues' can be established also empirically. The 'eternal issue' relates to the interpretation of this phenomenon. Realists, and 'absolutist', like Plato, maintain that 'qualities and universal values exist independently from human experience', and that when people disagree in 'assessment', some are 'right', while others are

'wrong'. I, however, am unable to conceive the notion that 'beauty, morality, and truth exist outside human experience'. In the least, ***language*** by which I have just expressed this notion is a human invention. Therefore, I have continued to ***believe*** in general relativism for roughly forty years.

On the other hand, ***I was able to suspend taking a position regarding the*** '***status of secondary qualities in the world***', ***since taking a position one way or the other regarding*** '***the status of color***' ***does not impact my day to day behavior***. I avoid getting run over by a 'car' irrespective of what I might happen to think about 'the status of the car in the world'. ***However***, ***I can not*** '***afford***' ***to assume the same stance with respect to*** '***tertiary qualities***', ***and*** '***valuation***' ***in general***. ***I am faced on a daily basis with situations that present me with a choice between two distinct and*** '***radically***' ***different positions regarding*** '***the status of values in the world***'. ***The choice among the two options influences my action***. For example, do I tell my colleagues at work when we differ "I am ***right*** and you are ***wrong***", and push for the implementation of "my ***perfect*** solutions", or instead, express my 'opinions' and 'preferences' and seek consensus? Since I happen to be one who prefers to be ***consistent***, I ***attempt*** not to waver between the two options of being a relativist or an 'absolutist'. I decided many years ago to adopt and adhere to the option that reflects my belief in relativism.

As to the subject matter of this book, I could have told the reader for example that "all statements are relative and subjective, ***except*** the statements of relativism which ***should*** be considered as ***objective***". I admit that, for a brief period roughly forty years ago, I harbored feelings that could have been expressed by this statement. However, I ***opted to be consistent*** and elected to tell all that "***I now tend to believe in relativism***".

My attitude in adopting relativism consistently can be detected in the title of my doctoral thesis, as well as in the title of this book. The title of the thesis was "Value, a General Discussion, or a Report of Experience". The words "***Report of Experience***" recur in both titles. Since the time I elected to hold relativism consistently, I stopped thinking that 'I could defend' let alone 'prove relativism'. I believe that: ***I can only describe the road that led me to adopt relativism, through reporting my experience***.

My choice in adopting relativism consistently had further 'serious' consequences that I will express next.

Dissolution of the Notion of 'General Improvement'

A person who believes that his assessments reflect 'real values in the outside world', would be convinced that the courses of action that he selects are 'correct', and would simply proceed to pursue them with confidence. An architect who thinks this way would consider a 'good' design scheme as 'worthy' of construction. If he contemplates alternative schemes for the design of a 'building', the 'best' scheme would be the one he 'selects' for implementation. Furthermore, he would be convinced that his action will 'improve conditions in the world'.

From my relativistic perspective however I thought differently. Any design for a 'building' that I might conceive is neither 'good' nor 'bad'. If my design is constructed, the resulting 'building'

would reside in the 'outside world', where it would have no 'intrinsic value'. The 'value' of the 'building' would '***materialize***' in the brains or minds of those who come to perceive it over its lifetime of say fifty years. From this relativistic point of view, I thought 'it is almost impossible to establish the value of the building'. Difficulties in 'establishing value' would relate to 'technical problems' in measuring and quantifying people's feelings. If the problems of quantification are somehow surmounted, it would still be difficult to identify and query all those who come in contact with the 'building' over a period of fifty years or more. If at all, I may be able to 'establish the value of the building' ***in retrospect***, but not in advance of its construction.

These considerations led me to a 'more serious dilemma' regarding the selection among alternative schemes for the design of a 'building'. If I contemplate different design schemes, how would I select a scheme for implementation? I may prefer one scheme to all others, but that would be the result of my own ***momentary*** 'subjective valuation' which may not correspond with the 'valuations' of others, and which may even vary over time. Alternatively, if I ask others for their assessment and 'preferences' regarding the different schemes and obtain a consensus, I would have considered a limited set of ***momentary*** 'subjective valuations' relating only to those I happen to query.

From my relativistic perspective -since I did not believe that 'value resides in the building as I perceive it'- I interpreted 'the best scheme that is worthy of construction' as the one that, if constructed, would produce 'the greatest amount of positive feelings', and 'the least amount of negative feelings' in those who happen to perceive it over its lifetime. To 'establish' this, I hypothesized, one would: a) start by constructing any one of the alternative scheme, and testing the impact of the resulting 'building' on those who would perceive it over the duration of its existence, b) ***go back in time*** and repeat the process for each of the alternative schemes, and c) compare the different impacts of the different 'buildings' and 'select' the scheme which had produced 'the most positive feelings' and 'the least negative feelings' in the minds of the perceivers; an approach that is obviously impossible. I contemplated yet another 'problem' in this context. The hypothetical exercise may clearly indicate a 'winning scheme', i.e. one that had produced 'more positive', ***as well as*** 'less negative', than all other schemes. However, what if the comparison reveals say, ten 'positive' points and one 'negative' point for one scheme, and nine 'positive' and zero 'negative' for another! In principle, how would I assign '***relative weights***' to the 'positive' and 'negative' in order to 'integrate' their respective impacts and reach a conclusion? In other words, what amount of 'elation' can 'compensate' for what amount of 'suffering'?

What I contemplated regarding the selection of a course of action in preparing a design scheme for a 'building', I thought would apply to the selection of any course of action, whether the contemplated action has the potential to affect my own 'well being', or that of others. I felt that I can not be 'certain' whether my action will lead to 'more positive feelings' or to 'more negative feelings', at least in 'the long run'. In other words I did not feel 'certain' whether any action I take would lead to the 'improvement' or 'worsening' of my own predicament, or that of others.

I entertained the following thoughts with respect to the meaning of "improvement". An example from every day experience may illustrate my position. When I experience an excruciating toothache, I usually visit the dentist who alleviates my 'pain'. I may consider that my condition has 'improved', since I would 'feel better' after visiting the dentist. However, I wish to point out ***two*** '***central***' ***conditions to accepting the meaning of*** "***improvement***" in this example. ***The first condition is that the meaning of*** "***improvement***" ***relates to myself only***. Seeing the dentist may have involved a tactic of coercion on my part to get the dentist to see me before other waiting

patients. I may have caused the prolongation of 'suffering' to others. ***The second condition relates to the span of time that involves*** '***improvement***'. Having relieved the 'pain' of my toothache does not mean that I will 'live happily for ever after'. I may have an allergy for the pain reliever I take, or may be struck by lightening upon leaving the dental clinic. I may expire shortly after getting rid of my toothache. Accordingly, I believe in the possibility of 'improvement' only within 'limited context', but do not believe in 'general improvement for all over time'. Consideration of the expansion of the notion of 'improvement' to include others, and of the extension of the span of time for which 'improvement' may apply, led to the 'dissolution' of my confidence in the notion of 'general improvement'.

In fact, I thought at one point that the neurons in the brain whose excitation leads to the experience of 'pleasure' and 'pain' have a limited capacity to 'fire'. They remain latent after firing until subsequently replenished by nutrients from the blood stream. This can be discerned in the reduced capacity for 'enjoyment' that develops in parallel with progressive degrees of 'satiation'. It may be that all of us have certain built in capacities for the experience of 'positive' and 'negative feelings' that apply, no matter what we do.

General Attitudes and the Use of Language

My attitudes changed in two main respects as a result of adopting relativism. I developed a ***tendency*** to: a) avoid what I consider 'projecting my value judgements to the outside world', and b) avoid 'patronizing' others. Both aspects are reflected in my use of language. For example, I generally prefer to use "I do not like", "I like", and "I prefer", instead of "bad", "good", and "better". If urged to give 'advice', I prefer to use "perhaps you could consider" instead of "you should" or "you must". I wish to admit however, that I have often 'caught myself' breaking my own rules. I have found it 'difficult' to consistently modify my attitudes and to shed established habits in the use of language. I have tended though to tailor the effort I make in being consistent to the particular occasion and the topic of conversation or discussion.

On the one hand, in every day conversations, if a friend suggests eating lunch at a particular restaurant that I happen to like, I may respond by saying: "excellent idea". I may 'slip' and tell my grand children: "you must drink your milk". On the other hand, in philosophical discussions, I try to be more careful. As I mentioned, I prefer to predicate assertions with the statement: "I, now, tend to believe the proposition (p)". The predication could be inserted in front of many of the assertions that I have already made, and many of those that I will make still in this book. I will not insert the predication, but request the reader to interpret the assertions I make in this light.

In between these two extremes of being 'loose' and 'extra careful' in the use of language, I assume 'middle courses' depending on the 'seriousness' of the discussion. Generally, I allow myself to make assertions about strictly personal matters, such as when I express that: "I feel well". I also allow myself to make assertions about events that I perceive, such as an assertion that "John entered the room"; I consider "John is a nice guy" however to belong to the category of my 'loose' usage of language. Otherwise I tend to formulate my utterances to express my 'point of view' or my 'opinion'. All of this I do, neither because I think that it is 'better' to do so, nor because I think that doing so will 'improve' my own predicament or that of others. I take the 'trouble' in using language in these ways because ***I happen to be one who prefers to be consistent***.

Summation

What transpired in the matter of my doctoral thesis and my excursion in philosophy can be summarized as follows.

Starting from my experience in architecture, although it was generally enjoyable and rewarding, it was also often frustrated by differing 'assessments' of my work, and by my own hesitation when I was involved in designing a project. I embarked on an excursion in the hope of finding generally accepted propositions that could be of help in resolving conflict and hesitation in the field of my interest. 'Alas', wide varying views and often opposing theses abounded in almost every field I read. Through my excursion, I came to the realization that 'disagreement and hesitation regarding most types of action is probably inevitable'. Believing strongly in this premise, I decided to address the issues relating to disagreement in general as the main theme of my thesis. As I mentioned, the title I chose for my thesis was "Value, a General Discussion, or a Report of Experience"! Initially, my program was to 'expound' relativism, and to propose that people refrain from 'projecting their subjective variable values to the outside world'. I was convinced that doing that would not necessarily end conflict. Conflict does not arise only as a result of differences in 'assessment'. It can arise when people agree about the 'value' of an 'object', such as when different nations agree about the 'value' of some 'natural resource' and go to war over its acquisition. I thought however that at least, people could avoid what I considered to be 'unnecessary' conflicts in communicating about 'objects'.

In architecture, instead of saying that a 'building' or a 'project' is "beautiful" or "ugly" and argue about 'its intrinsic value', those harboring different 'assessments' could use the words "I admire" and "I like", or alternatively "I abhor" and "I dislike" in expressing their 'assessment', and possibly avoid further 'debate'. Also, one could use "I prefer" instead of "better", and hopefully avoid an 'argument'.

However, at some point in the development of my thoughts I came to realize that my sympathizing with physiological idealism, or any other philosophical position including relativism, probably resulted from my own particular 'subjective and variable valuation' of the '***arguments***' that I happened to encounter in my research. In parallel, one of the main lessons I learned from philosophy was to be skeptical, i.e. to question the 'truth' of any proposition I contemplate to adopt. Reading in philosophy, and in particular reading Bertrand Russell, thought me about 'skepticism'. These considerations influenced my adoption of general relativism.

Most philosophers persisted in making assertions about the same matters that they teach us to be skeptical about. Many promoted skepticism, while speaking of general relativism as a "most ***derided*** and ***untenable*** position". Unlike most philosophers, I opted to be consistent in my skepticism, and applied the statements of general relativism to general relativism itself. My decision to accept the consistent application of relativism constituted a departure from philosophy as I had come to understand it. Ultimately, and consistently, I reached the conclusion that I can neither 'defend' nor 'prove' relativism. I can however, as I have, show the road that led me to be a skeptic and a relativist. Getting to be a relativist and a skeptic is the ultimate residual effect of my excursion into philosophy.

More 'seriously' my skepticism proliferated further to the considerations relating to action that I

mentioned, and resulted in the dissolution of my confidence in the notion of 'general improvement'. This affected my attitudes: I generally felt disinclined to tell others what to do and what not to do. In particular, my attitude towards my thesis changed. I raised the question: would what I propose in my thesis, if accepted and followed by others, lead to the experience of 'more positive and less negative feelings'? My answer was that I was not 'certain'. I argued further: 'then, why say anything at all'?

The above considerations led me to abandon my thesis. What transpired afterwards, which led me to write this book, I will explain as my tale further unfolds.

Before I end this chapter, I wish to make a confession. I have visited philosophy when I worked on my thesis, and revisited it more recently when I got engaged in writing this book. I will admit that I have allways felt 'ill at ease' when I addressed philosophical topics. Language, as we all learn it, generally embodies a realist position. Expressing idealism and relativism in common language involves the usage of a medium that embodies 'a contradictory position' to what one is attempting to express. The thoughts I contemplate in this context are reflected in my 'extensive' use of single inverted commas. I have used the commas in highlighting the generic word "object" whose meaning was being modified in the course of the discussion. I also used the commas to highlight sundry other words and statements that I consider to involve 'subjective valuation'. From now on I will drop the single inverted commas when I use "object" and other words relating to 'physical entities' such as the "world". However, I will continue to use the single inverted commas to indicate words and statements that I think reflect 'subjective valuation'.

Chapter 3 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Foreword

I decided to abandon my thesis for the reasons that I expressed at the end of the previous chapter, and returned full time to the practice of archiecture around 1965. My skepticism regarding the notion of 'general improvement' did not stifle my action. I chose to continue to live, and 'needed' to 'earn' my living by practicing my profession.

Through the years of professional practice, I continued to uphold the relativistic position that I had developed earlier as a doctoral student. I continued to maintain my skepticism regarding the 'improvement' of my own predicament over time, and to the 'improvement' of the predicament of others as a result of my action. However, I applied myself to professional practice, at least technically, in very much the same way as I had done prior to my excursion in philosophy.

The effects of my research in philosophy on my practice were reflected in certain 'nuances' in my behavior that can be discerned from what I will relate about my practical experience. In particular, my use of single inverted commas in the following text to indicate words that I believe involve 'subjective variable valuation' will illustrate some of the 'subtle' changes in my attitude that resulted from my excursion in philosophy, and that impacted my professional practice.

Summary of Professional Practice

Although initially trained as an architect, I got involved over the years in the related fields of urban design and urban/city planning. Urban design usually addresses 'larger' spatial context compared with architecture, often involving groups of buildings rather than a single building. It takes into consideration the volumetric and visual aspects of development, albeit not to the extent of detail expected in architectural design. City planning usually involves yet 'larger' expanses of land, but focuses more on the socioeconomic and functional aspects of urban development.

By chance, my career unfolded in such a way that I did not specialize in certain types of projects. Instead, I got involved in an exceptionally wide variety of assignments. I was involved in projects ranging from the alteration of an existing small building, to the planning of a city with a population of several million people. The different projects that I got involved in could be plotted on a gradually increasing scale of size and complexity. I got involved in a mixture of architectural, urban design, and urban planning assignments throughout my carrier. In recent years however, I have been involved almost exclusively in urban planning assignments.

My professional experience was not limited to a particular country or locality. I was involved in different types of projects in more than ten countries, on four continents.

General Attitude in Professional Practice

My professional activities are initiated usually by a commission from a client to perform certain design or planning services. Typically my action starts by gathering information about my client, and about the site of the project. In architecture, for example, information regarding my client covers his perception of his 'needs', his 'preferences', and his 'expectations'. Information regarding the site of the project includes aspects such as topography, soil and subsoil conditions, and so on. Having gathered information to my 'satisfaction', I apply myself to the task of designing the building for my client. The process of design involves a series of 'assessments' and 'reasoning' in my mind, leading to a 'synthesis' that embodies a design scheme for the project. Usually, I explicitly express my 'assessments' and 'reasoning' by way of diagrams and sketches, and attempt to involve my client in the process of 'design'. I also often consider different alternative schemes for the design of a project, and seek my client's input in selecting a 'preferred' scheme. If we differ in 'valuation', I do not necessarily give in immediately to my client's '***expressed*** preferences'. I often 'argue' my case by explicitly expressing my 'reasons', which often relate to matters he may not have considered, or to conditions that I can visualize but that he could not imagine. The extent to which I 'argue' my case usually relates to the degree of strength of my feelings regarding the selection of a 'preferred' course for action that would more closely fulfill ***my client's*** 'desires'. Irrespective of how strongly I feel about any particular 'issue' however, I do not think that 'I am right', and that my client is 'wrong'. I ultimately abide by my client's 'preferences'. The process of 'design', which includes interaction with my client, eventually leads to the realization of a building that my client and I are at least 'satisfied' with. Quite often, we are both 'elated' about the final product. Having completed my assignment I do not think that I created a 'magnificent piece of architecture'. I may have helped in the provision of shelter, or space for work for others that could be considered as an 'improvement' of conditions. Yet, I maintain my skepticism regarding the 'value' of the building, and the notion of 'general improvement' per my relativistic position. I have assumed this attitude throughout the myriad of different projects that came my way.

Comparison between Different Types of Assignments

In my professional experience, I discerned similarities in my activities through out the varied range of assignments that I addressed. The similarities lie in that my efforts were geared to accommodating human activities in a physical environment. The efforts ranged from accommodating one individual to live or work in a limited space, to accommodating a population of people to live in a city. There were differences in my activities however, which related to the nature and relative complexity of each particular assignment. I can relate the degrees of complexity to several factors. The factors generally relate to: a) the type of the project, b) the size of the project, c) the scope of work to be covered, and, d) the 'nature' of the client.

The type of project, whether it is for a house, a school, or a hospital impacts the complexity of activities and effort required to complete the project. The degree of complexity usually increases progressively in the order of the types of projects that I cited. Larger projects of the same type are usually more complex and require more effort to complete. In residential design, preparing a design scheme for a mansion usually requires more effort, compared with the design of a 'modest' house. The scope of work, whether it covers the preparation of construction documents only, or whether it includes also supervision of construction, impacts the magnitude of my efforts. The number of

individuals on the client's side also influences the degree of complexity, and the effort involved in professional assignments. Generally, the complexity relating to the 'nature' of the client starts from the case where I design a building for one client, as when I design a house for a bachelor. The complexity usually increases as the number of individuals increases on the client's side, as in the case of designing a residence for a family where the husband and wife, and possibly their adult children have different and conflicting 'expectations'. Then comes the case of a client represented by committee, where several members may hold varied and opposing positions. The higher degrees of complexity in this context relate to urban planning assignments where several committees and agencies may be involved, and further, where I consider a total population with conflicting interests as my ultimate client.

The increase of complexity in professional assignments which influences the types of activities, and the extent of effort that would be required to complete each particular project are usually reflected in contracts for the provision of professional services. In the relatively 'simple' architectural assignment of designing a residence, a typical contract would refer to the intended size and the program of uses which covers living areas, number of bedrooms, and so on. The typical contract usually indicates the progression of the professional activities to be undertaken. These are usually: schematic design, preliminary design, preparation of construction documents, and construction site visitation, or construction supervision as required. Contracts for larger architectural projects are more elaborate. They may include: the preparation of detailed specifications describing all the elements that will be incorporated in constructing the building, bills of quantities of all materials that will be used in construction, tender documents to solicit bids from construction contractors, critical path schedules describing the sequence of construction, and possibly more tasks 'commensurate' with the 'importance' of the project.

The tasks involved in urban planning work are in many ways similar to the tasks involved in relatively 'simple' architectural assignments. However, they tend to be more elaborate. For example, the act of acquainting oneself with a single client in the case of a 'small' building project expands to numerous activities to gather information about socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of a given population in the case of an urban planning assignment. The task of gathering information about the site of the project, a relatively 'simple' task in the case of a plot of land for a house, gets 'bloated' to gathering information about conditions in an entire city in the case of city planning. Further complexity relates to the dynamic changes of conditions in a city over time, compared with the changes of conditions relating to a building plot and a single client. The extent of complexity in urban planning also impacts the types of output that are expected from various assignments. In architectural assignments, the final output is usually a physical building. Urban planning studies on the other hand often only reach the stage of formulating general strategies and policies for action.

Such increases in complexity are reflected in the contracts for providing professional services in urban planning, which dwell on 'elaborate' explanations of the tasks to be performed, the methodologies to be pursued, and the definition of the outputs to be realized from urban planning studies. In particular, ***methodologies*** that may be briefly expressed, or implicitly recognized but not at all articulated in a contract to design a building, are usually articulated in detail in contracts for urban planning studies.

The activities involved at the opposite ends of the spectrum of complexity are usually different in numerous ways, and are often carried out by different types of 'experts', to the point that the

similarities among different assignments that I alluded to above get 'blurred' beyond 'easy' recognition. For example, the act of 'design' which I consider to be 'largely intuitive', and involved in some measure throughout the spectrum of the different types of assignments that came my way, is rarely mentioned in conjunction with large scale urban planning studies. On the other hand, the process of 'planning' which is considered to be 'rational', and which I regard also as involved in the full spectrum of assignments, is rarely explicitly referred to in respect of 'small' building projects. In the case of designing a house, the planning process to be pursued is usually implicitly recognized and followed, but is rarely expressed. Reference to planning in architectural design contracts may only appear in phrases regarding the "preparation of plans", without describing ***how*** plans are to be prepared. The ***planning process*** to be pursued in urban planning is however almost always explicitly articulated and expressed in detail in the case of large scale urban planning studies.

Summation

I have described the similarities between different assignments that came my way, and mentioned the differences between these assignment that relate to complexity, and to the different 'nature' of a client. In particular, devising a scheme for action in architecture may involve the integration of the 'values' of only two individuals, an architect and his client; or possibly three individuals, not to forget the building official whose 'values' have to be integrated in order to obtain 'approval' of the project. Urban planning on the other hand involves more people, and a quantum increase in the different 'value judgements' to be integrated in preparing a scheme for action. This leads to increasing the 'difficulty' of developing consensus. The 'difficulty' was generally reflected in my experience. I was able to reach greater degrees of agreement and 'satisfaction' with my clients on architectural assignments, compared with urban planning assignments.

However, my experience in urban planning in recent years heightened my awareness of relativistic 'issues'. It rekindled my interest in the subject matter of my 'aborted' thesis, and inspired me to write this book. Therefore, I will devote the following two chapters to introduce the field of urban planning, and to express particular results of my experience in the field that 'pertain' to my writing this book.

Chapter 4 AN INTRODUCTION TO URBAN PLANNING

Foreword

My aim in this chapter is to focus on the types of activities commonly referred to as '***planning***' activities. They are applicable in the case of designing a house, and in planning a city. The activities are also involved in planning a vacation, and planning for national defense. In line with my strategy in this book, I will present only certain aspects of planning that relate to my personal experience.

The following text is intended to generally familiarize the reader with the field of urban planning, and to highlight certain activities in the field that 'pertain' to my 'purposes' in writing this book. The text is not intended as a technical essay on urban planning. The interested reader is referred to textbooks, such as "Introduction to Urban Planning" for a more comprehensive exposition of the field (Anthony J. Catanese, James C. Snyder, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979). I will initiate the discussion of planning with a quotation from this book. Under the main title "Planning Theory", and the subtitle "What is Planning?" the book states (p 108):

> "We defined theory in terms that could apply to any field of professional practice. An account of planning theory must therefore, relate it specifically to planning and will subsume the question, "What is Planning?". Nearly 20 years ago John Dyckman referred to the discussion of this last question as "a literature of controversy"; recently, Henry Hightower said, "the 'square one' question is: 'what is planning'". Clearly, not much has changed. Over the years, however, many attempts have been made to find an answer. The various definitions of planning proposed cover a wide range but do not indicate a consensus."

The book proceeds to review a number of alternative definitions of "planning" that are considered to be "not necessarily mutually exclusive".

What I will say next about urban planning represents one perspective derived from my own practical experience. It will be brief, and tailored to the purposes of this book. It is not intended to 'resolve' the question 'what is planning?'

Generally, I consider urban planning as an effort to accommodate people to live in a physical environment. Now, the overall population of the world has been constantly growing. In parallel however, the population of certain areas has been declining. The migration of rural populations to urban centers is one example reflecting this condition. In both cases of declining and growing population, the urban planner is called upon to anticipate future conditions, and to plan for future urban development. I will generally refer to the more common example of planning to accommodate population growth. Accommodating population growth may be achieved by expansion of existing urban areas, or by creating new human settlements such as new towns and cities. I have been involved in both types of approach. However, for the purposes of discussion, I will present the more common case of planning for the growth of existing urban areas.

The Urban Planning Process / The Main Types of Activities Involved in Urban Planning

The activities of urban planning vary depending on the nature of the urban planning assignment. Following is a brief description of the typical activities involved in the common case of planning for the potential future expansion of an existing urban area.

Data Collection, Organization, and Storage

These activities are undertaken to document existing and past conditions regarding any urban area intended for study. The information gathered generally relates to people and to the environment. Information regarding people includes demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Information regarding the environment covers various facets and conditions of the natural and built environment. Information is gathered and updated by various methods such as by record keeping of changes in conditions when they occur, as in the case of births and deaths, or through field surveys, for example, to identify 'derelict' building conditions. Information is usually organized and stored electronically, often in elaborate systems referred to as Geographic Information Systems. They facilitate the retrieval and use of available information. In addition, information regarding the institutions and regulations that impact urban planning are compiled for each particular area intended for study.

Analysis / 'Assessment' of Conditions, Identification of Trends, Existing and Future 'Requirements', and 'Issues'

Analysis or 'assessment' is undertaken in 'quantitative' or 'qualitative' fashion. 'Quantitative assessment' applies to certain parameters that can be represented by numbers, such as for example those relating to the number of the population, and to the movement of vehicles. 'Qualitative assessment' applies to parameters such as visual 'quality'. The analysis of gathered information including the changes in conditions over time, leads to the identification of trends. For example, consecutive census counts, and information regarding fertility rates of an indigenous population, births and deaths, in and out migration, and other historical data are analyzed to identify past trends in changes to the population number and characteristics. Other trends may relate to residential land uses, and to the changes in the prevalence of various types of dwelling units by spatial location. Various methods are then used to extrapolate or project historical trends into the future, in an attempt to estimate the future population of the area under consideration, and to quantify various 'needs' that will be required to sustain the population in the future. Computer modeling is often used for these purposes. In particular, modeling is often used to anticipate changes relating to population numbers and to traffic movement.

The 'assessment' of existing and historical conditions also leads to the identification of past and present 'problems'; more often referred to in urban planning as 'issues'. 'Issues' may relate to 'shortages' in housing, to traffic 'congestion', or to 'deficits' in the provision of community facilities such as schools and clinics. The projection of trends can indicate whether existing 'problems' will 'improve', or be further 'aggravated' in the future. Projection can also indicate the potential for new 'issues' to arise, if the identified trends continue to prevail. I might add in this context that an urban area can be considered as a living organism, and that the early activities of urban planning are concerned with the 'diagnosis' of conditions, the identification of existing

'problems', and the quantification of future 'needs' in the area designated for study.

Formulation of 'Goals' and 'Objectives'

The definition of 'goals' generally involves the contemplation of a 'vision' that envisages the 'rectification' of 'undesirable' conditions, and the promotion of 'desirable' ones. 'Goals' and 'objectives' usually address the 'issues', and the 'needs' that have been identified. For example, if one of the 'issues' identified relates to a 'shortage' of 'affordable' housing to 'low income' groups of the population, the corresponding goal might state: "Provide 'adequate' 'affordable' housing to 'low income' groups in the city". Objectives relate in turn to expressed goals, but are further articulated and often quantified. An objective could state: "Provide 1000 'affordable' housing units in the inner city by the year 2010".

Identification of 'Opportunities', and 'Constraints'

Continuing with the example of 'affordable' housing, an 'opportunity' might relate to the existence of 'relatively inexpensive' vacant land in the inner city that is 'suitable' to accommodate the required number of 'affordable' housing units. A 'constraint' in the same context could relate to the lack of such 'inexpensive' vacant land in the inner city.

Synthesis / Integration, and Preparation of Alternative Scenarios and Schemes for Action

The preparation of scenarios for action is concerned with finding possible 'remedies' and 'solutions' to 'resolve' identified 'problems', and to meet anticipated 'needs' for urban development. The activities involve 'synthesis' of elements from previous analysis, including identified 'issues', 'needs', 'opportunities' and 'constraints', and stated 'goals' and 'objectives'.

I would like to point out in this context that no amount of analysis could lead ***by itself*** to conceiving a solution. The activities involved in synthesis, in my view, are akin to those involved in an 'intuitive' act of 'design', and probably involve 'fuzzy logic'. Furthermore, while different parameters may be analyzed by different specialists in an urban planning team, overall synthesis takes place in one mind; often the team leader's mind. Usually a number of alternative 'solutions' is conceived. The number of alternatives is often limited to three different options. The potential 'solutions' can vary in nature, and level of detail. Alternative 'solutions' may be conceived at the level of strategies and policies to address the 'issues' and the 'needs' that have been identified, such as in the case when alternative strategies are conceived to revitalize the development of a 'deteriorating' inner city. The alternative strategies and associated policies could be conceived in the form of statements that may propose, for example, 'improving' public transportation, and reducing property and sales taxes in the targeted area. Alternative solutions may be conceived otherwise in the form of urban development or redevelopment schemes. The alternative schemes may be in the form of urban design projects for example, to provide housing, roads, infrastructure, community facilities, and pedestrian paths and landscaping in an area of study.

'Evaluation' of Alternatives and Selection of a 'Preferred' Alternative

The activities involved in this stage of urban planning are concerned with the '***evaluation***' of the

various types of alternative 'solutions' against stated 'goals' and 'objectives'. Matrices are often prepared to 'gauge' the extent to which each alternative 'solution' would 'meet' each of the 'goals' and 'objectives' that has been previously 'agreed to'. The alternative scenario or scheme that is considered to 'meet' 'goals' and 'objectives' 'most closely' is 'selected' and proposed for adoption and implementation.

Preparation for Implementation

The proposals and recommendations that result from planning studies involve various types and categories of potential action. Generally, the urban planner's activities in respect of implementation are concerned with attempts to bring the results of study to materialization. Implementation may involve the preparation and adoption of codes and regulations, or securing budgets for further detailed study, or for actual construction. The steps involved in implementation, and the phasing of development are usually indicated.

The Urban Planning Process as Continuous and Iterative

Since conditions constantly change, urban planners constantly strive to update their databases, and periodically repeat the types of activities involved in urban planning that I mentioned. The iterative nature of urban planning activities can be discerned in the case where the activities involved in preparing alternative 'solutions' 'reveals' the 'impracticability' of achieving stated 'goals' and 'objectives'. In such a case 'goals' and 'objectives' would be reformulated, and previously undertaken work may be repeated. Another example that illustrates the iterative nature of planning relates to the transportation element in urban planning. New roads and highways are often constructed to 'alleviate' traffic 'congestion'. Invariably however, new roads and highways attract progressively 'more' traffic. Vehicular traffic 'spurs' new urban development that in turn increases traffic, and the cycle continues leading to traffic 'congestion' of the newly constructed road. This usually leads to the reiteration of the planning process.

Furthermore, the initiation and reiteration of the activities involved in urban planning may not necessary occur in the sequence that I indicated above. Urban planning studies may be initiated through recognition of a 'problem', as for example, when a segment of the population complains about a 'shortage' of health facilities in their area. The collection of 'pertinent' information by the urban planner in this case may follow, rather than precede the activities of the identification of the problem. The urban planning process may be initiated also through expression of a 'goal'. A 'political goal' could be expressed to 'improve conditions in the inner city'. The steps of gathering information and the identification of 'problems' or 'issues' involved in meeting the stated 'goal' would follow. In some cases urban planning could be initiated through 'identification of an opportunity', as in the case when a developer identifies 'inexpensive' land that could be developed for 'profit'.

The Spatial Context of Urban Planning / The Hierarchy of Planning Studies / The Top Down and Bottom Up Approaches

Urban planning can be addressed at different spatial levels. The levels of study are usually

classified in 'hierarchical order'. In descending order of extent of spatial coverage and generality, the hierarchy of urban planning studies is usually classified into national, regional, city, town, village, district, and local area levels. Approaching planning studies sequentially in such an order is referred to as a *top down approach*. On the other hand, considering a local area with a view of discovering the potential impact of local conditions on considerations at higher levels of study is referred to as a *bottom up approach*. Generally, the hierarchy of studies involves progressively more attention to detail in descending order, starting from the more general at the national level, to the most specific at the local area level.

The Time Frame for Urban Planning / 'Short', 'Medium', and 'Long' Term Planning

The time frame designated for urban planning studies can vary. Prevailing convention defines 'short' term planning for periods between one to five years, 'medium' term, from five to ten years, and 'long' term, from ten to twenty years. I have been involved more in 'long' term planning than in 'short' or 'medium' term planning assignments. I also 'prefer' to approach planning from a 'long' term perspective, where 'short' and 'medium' term activities are conceived as phases of a 'long' term plan.

A commonly used period in city planning is twenty years from the time of starting a study, such as from the year 2000, to the year 2020. The year 2020 would be referred to as the planning horizon. The urban planner is expected to anticipate changes in conditions, and to address 'issues' and 'needs' within the planning period up to the designated planning horizon.

The Parameters Addressed in Urban Planning

The parameters addressed in urban planning are usually classified into two main categories relating to people, and to the environment. The parameters relating to people are grouped under "socioeconomic conditions". These include subcategories relating to population demographic, social, and economic characteristics and conditions, and cover topics such as population fertility, natural growth rates, age cohorts, family composition, employment, income levels, spending patterns, and so on. The category of parameters relating to environmental conditions, covers natural and man made resources. It covers surface, subsurface, and air quality conditions, as well as building conditions, land use, land values, land ownership, all modes of transportation, and utilities infrastructure. The parameter relating to land use is subdivided into the subcategories of residential, commercial, industrial, public and community facilities, and vacant land. The residential and commercial subcategories are classified further into different types and densities, and so on.

Consideration of 'Wider' Context in Urban Planning

Each particular assignment in urban planning is addressed in what is commonly referred technically as "wider context". The term commonly refers to 'wider' spatial context, but can be understood also to involve expansion of the time, and parameters covered by study.

'Wider' Spatial Context

Areas designated for urban planning studies are usually considered in 'wider' spatial context. For example, a national urban planning study usually takes into consideration international conditions, since the latter invariably impact considerations at the national level. In similar fashion the study of a region is usually addressed in the national context, and the study of a city is usually addressed in the context of the region where the city is located, and so on. The study of a local area may involve the consideration of conditions in the district, or the entire city in which the local area is located.

Expansion of the Span of Time Covered by Study

The collection of historical data, and their analysis, can be extended backward to cover past conditions starting from the time of initial inceptions of human settlement in the area of study, or even to earlier pristine conditions. This usually provides 'insights' that could be 'used' in conceiving schemes for future development. Also, the planning horizon may be extended forward in time beyond 20 years. Although prediction tends to be 'more tenuous' for 'longer' periods of time in the future, the exercise of projecting prevailing trends can be used to 'highlight' potential 'problems'. For example one could project population growth for the next 50 years at a certain prevailing rate, although the rate is not expected to continue that long. This is often done in order to illustrate the potential 'adverse' conditions that might materialize ***if*** the particular rate of growth continued.

Increasing the Number of Parameters Covered by Study

Generally, the urban planner can 'assess' and make use of almost any type of information that is available about people, and the environment. For example information regarding the rate of incidence of crime, car and pedestrian accidents, and health conditions, which may be thought of as not of the urban planner's business, are often 'assessed' by planners to identify 'deficiencies' in the urban and social fabric of a city. The extent of the parameters that could be covered in urban planning may be considered 'open-ended'!

Examples of Different Approaches to Urban Planning

Following are some of the main types of approach to urban planning. Urban planners attempt to apply the planning process in addressing 'issues' irrespective of the type of approach they elect to pursue.

Reactive and Proactive Planning

The classification into these two types of approach relates to the urban planner's general ***attitude*** in addressing 'issues'. The reactive mode could be understood as exemplifying an attitude to cope with 'issues' as they occur. I do not consider this to mean 'planning' but rather spontaneous problem solving. Another way of interpreting the term "reactive planning" which I agree with implies the acceptance of particular identified conditions and trends, and assuming that they will prevail in the future. In this sense, the urban planner assumes a reactive attitude towards conditions

and trends that he 'feels' that he does not wish to change, can not change, or 'has no business' in changing. The reactive attitude is reflected often in the planner's acceptance of population socioeconomic conditions and trends, as for example, the rate of growth of a particular population.

The proactive mode embodies an attitude to interfere with, and to change conditions and trends. The urban planner assumes a proactive attitude when he thinks that certain conditions or trends 'need to be changed in order to meet stated goals and objectives'. A mixture of both attitudes prevails in practice, and applies in all the following types of approaches to urban planning.

Prevention, Visionary, and Crisis Planning

I consider "crisis planning" to be synonymous with "reactive planning", in the sense that it means coping with events and 'problems' as they occur. As such, I do not consider 'crisis planning' as a form of 'planning' but rather, as a form of problem solving. Prevention and visionary planning respectively attempt to avoid 'negative' conditions, and to attain 'positive' conditions in the future. I have found the entities entrusted with planning that I have encountered in my career to be involved more with putting out fires, i.e. spontaneous problem solving, rather than with prevention or visionary planning.

Comprehensive Economic and Urban Development Planning

Changes in the economy affect urban development, and the rate of growth or decline in economic development usually leads to parallel changes in urban development. The urban planner can assume a reactive attitude in this respect by accepting the economic forecasts prepared by economists, and by addressing the likely impacts on urban development. Alternatively, the urban planner can join forces with the economic planner, and jointly address both economic and urban planning development. This leads to the *integration* of their respective inputs, and allows the 'concerns' of the urban planner to influence the economic planner, and visa versa. Ministries of planning are established in many countries to approach planning in this fashion.

Comprehensive Physical Urban Planning

Economic planning and urban planning are often undertaken by different independent entities. "Comprehensive urban planning" refers to the case where the urban planner takes economic development into consideration, but carries his work independently from the economic planner. The approach is sometimes termed "comprehensive ***physical*** planning" to indicate that the study does not cover economic planning in proactive fashion. The word "comprehensive" in this approach may be understood to indicate that 'all' parameters involved in urban planning would be addressed. The approach is sometimes also understood as indicating a top down approach, envisaging the completion of the hierarchy of planning studies starting from the national level, and proceeding through lower levels of studies all the way down to the detailed planning of local areas.

Strategic Urban Planning

The term "strategic planning" is some times used to indicate the planner's intent to stop his work at the level of conceiving general strategies for action, without getting to the level of conceiving particular 'solutions' and schemes for physical implementation. In another sense, the term refers to

the planner's intent to limit his work to addressing 'critical' issues only, sometimes perhaps even in 'detail'. This involves '***ranking***' identified 'issues', and assigning '***priority***' to addressing the 'most critical' among them. A third possible meaning relates to the planner's intent to match his work to 'available resources'. The second and third definitions are 'closely' related to each other. From my own practical experience I have come to consider the latter two definitions as demonstrating a 'central issue' to urban planning, and to the concept of planning in general.

Urban planning consulting assignments come in 'packets' to be performed within specified 'constraints' of time and fees. They often involve areas of hundreds, and sometimes thousands of square kilometers. The 'problem' arises in urban planning as to how much 'terrain', spatial and otherwise, could be covered within the period of between one and three years that is commonly specified for urban planning studies. By 'necessity', only a limited quantum of 'issues' can be addressed and 'resolved'. The preference to address 'important' rather than 'trivial issues', 'predicates' the consideration of 'criticality' and 'prioritization', i.e. 'strategizing'. These considerations apply to all sorts of planning. The relatively 'larger' spatial expanse involved in urban planning only 'highlights' the 'issue'. All types of planning activities are undertaken within some form of 'constraint' or another, which 'predicates' 'strategizing'. From this perspective therefore, all types of planning could be considered as strategic.

The Development of Consensus and Public Participation

Urban planning as practiced today, is a relatively modern phenomenon. Historically, urban planning efforts usually involved a potentate and an architect, in a way similar to that of an individual commissioning an architect to design a building. The potentate assumed the decision making role as a single 'client', and the architect tended to address limited physical 'design' parameters in 'largely intuitive' fashion. The general public was rarely involved in the process of urban planning. Potentates in some developing countries, and some major developers still approach urban planning in similar fashion, albeit more parameters are now being taken into consideration in the preparation of schemes for urban development than in the past. Contemporary practice however, commonly involves government entities, and numerous individuals on the decision making side of the 'client'. Although the general public is often not directly involved in the process of planning, reaching agreement regarding action in contemporary practice involves the development of 'consensus' among numerous 'players'.

Recent developments in the field however, indicate a trend to involve the people affected by planning, in the planning process. One of the 'buzz words' in the field of urban planning in recent years is "public participation". This trend is reflected in certain urban planning efforts, in particular in urban redevelopment projects that affect the lives of a resident population. Planners 'set up shop' in the area targeted for study. From their location within the community, the planners strive to interact with the local resident, seek their participation in the planning process, and engage the residents in the 'assessment' of conditions, and in developing consensus for potential action. The 'reason' for this recent trend, I suspect, is that more urban planners are tending to become 'relativist'.

Relativism and the 'Rationality' of the Planning Process

Urban planning, like architecture, is a field of endeavor that is '***geared***' to action. By my definition, ***every step*** involved in the planning process is driven by individual momentary 'subjective value judgement'. I hope that my 'extensive' use of single inverted commas in the text of this chapter has helped to illustrate the 'extent of prevalence of subjective and potentially variable valuation' in the urban planning process. "The '***assessment***' of existing conditions", "the identification of '***issues***'", "the '***prioritization***' of '***issues***'", "the '***evaluation***' and '***ranking***' of alternatives and the '***selection***' of a '***preferred***' alternative", are all phrases describing main steps in the planning process. Each phrase includes one or more words that I consider as reflecting the involvement of 'subjective and potentially variable valuation'. I wish to 'consolidate' my views in this respect by citing a few examples.

For example, the 'assessment' of existing conditions in a large metropolis some times 'reveals' the presence of squatter shacks, slums, or a shantytown near the center of the city. This could be referred to in urban planning jargon as 'having identified ***issues*** relating to the existence of substandard housing, and the presence of negative visual conditions in the heart of the city'. Quite often however, the residents of the shantytown do not consider their living there to constitute an '***issue***' for them. In spite of that, traditionally, the '***preferred***' urban planning '***solution***' under such circumstances was to raze the shantytown to the ground and to replace it with other uses 'commensurate with the prime location of the cite'. The residents of the shantytown would be relocated to 'adequate affordable housing' to be erected on 'inexpensive land', usually in a 'remote' location. The first part of the 'solution' was usually accomplished, i.e., the shantytown was usually demolished, while the provision of 'affordable' housing rarely materialized. Even in the rare cases where alternative housing was provided to squatters, the residents of shantytowns quite often did not consider such arrangements as representing a '***preferred solution***'. These considerations illustrate one historical example of different 'value judgements' among squatters and urban planners. In recent years, even urban planners themselves have changed their 'views' in this context. Most urban planners no longer consider the existence of a shantytown as necessarily reflecting an 'issue', but rather as reflecting an 'economic reality'. They limit the extent of their involvement to attempts to 'improve' social and sanitary conditions for squatters.

The 'identification' of 'opportunities' and 'constraints' is an activity that also illustrates the involvement of 'subjective valuation' in the planning process. For example, the existence of a shantytown in the inner city may be considered by some as providing an 'opportunity for redevelopment'. Others who harbor 'concerns' regarding the relocation of squatters may consider the existence of the shantytown as a 'constraint to redevelopment'. I have hesitated myself, and have witnessed many of my colleagues hesitate about the consideration of 'opportunities' and 'constraints' as we ponder how they 'appear' from different perspectives.

Another example of the incidence of 'subjective variable valuation' can be discerned in the use of 'valuation matrices', which by the way are often referred to as "***subjective*** valuation matrices". I will not dwell on relating particulars involved in such exercises, but will remind the reader of the general 'problem' that we discussed earlier regarding the assignment of '***relative ranking weights***' to the different parameters under 'evaluation'. For example, grade-separated junctions are often contemplated to 'improve the flow of traffic'. However, such junctions are often considered by

some to have 'negative visual impact'. The question arises as to 'how much relative weight could be accorded respectively to the visual and to the transportation parameters'. This 'problem' can be encountered also in assigning 'relative values' to the 'pains associated with relocating a resident population' versus the 'economic benefits to be derived from urban redevelopment'.

Assigning 'priority' is another activity in urban planning that people are likely to disagree about. They usually differ in 'assessment' of what is 'important', 'more important', and 'most important'. I can go on, but will stop with citing this measure of examples.

Now, by most urban planners' account, urban planning employs the 'planning process' that is considered to be '***rational***'. In "Chapter 2", we considered the definition of 'rationality' as involving the articulation of one's 'reasons' for action. We also considered the notion of the 'regress of reasons', and that people can proceed 'rationally' only ***if*** and when they have found 'common grounds'. What then could be the 'role' of 'rationality' in urban planning, a field where one can expect disagreement to prevail? "Introduction to Urban Planning", the book that I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, provides a possible answer. It states (p 111):

> "The use of rationality is not intrinsically related to either success or failure; i.e., there is no guarantee that choices arrived at rationally will be ***good*** choices. In fact, many if not most such choices would be the same if they had been arrived at intuitively. The axioms of rationality simply insure internal logical consistency, and rational analysis provides a framework to display the decision maker's values and assessments."

While I keep my reservations regarding the formulation of the first sentence in the above quotation, I find the quotation to reflect the gist of my own 'assessment' of the role of 'rationality', and the 'intent' of its 'use', when the planning process is adopted. In particular, I concur with the statement that "rational analysis provides a framework to ***display*** the decision maker's values and assessments." I will elaborate on this topic as I express my own attitude regarding planning in the following chapter.

Before I leave this topic however, I wish to express some of my thoughts regarding the use of the word "rational" in conjunction with planning. If I use an articulated planning process to plan my own affairs, I would be prepared to accept the statement that "I followed a rational process", as opposed to having been "irrational" in devising a scheme for my action. I would accept the use of the word "rational" in this context since presumably, adhering to the planning process would have led me to explicitly recognize my own 'reasons' in systematic fashion in reaching a conclusion for action. On the other hand however, if I use my own 'reasons' when I plan for others, irrespective of how systematic and articulated an approach I may have used, I would not refer to my planning exercise as being "rational". I take this position because relying only on my own 'assessments' could result in forgoing the integration of the 'values' of those I am trying to plan for. ***These considerations lead me to a tentative definition of "rationality". If the word "rational" is to be used at all in the case of planning for others, I would use it as reflecting 'degrees of rationality that are proportional to the extent of integration of the values of those affected by planning'***. Generally I prefer to use the words "systematic", and "articulated", rather than the word "rational", to describe the planning process.

Summation

I gave an outline of urban planning, and indicated the types of activities and the kinds of considerations that are involved in the field. The reader can conceive how the types of activities and the related considerations that I mentioned could apply to all sorts of planning activities. When I plan a vacation I may obtain brochures about different areas that I could visit, flip through the brochures, and decide where I will spend my vacation. I would have gone through the steps of 'data collection, analysis, identification of opportunities and constraints, etc., without necessarily being consciously aware of each of these steps. I may not explicitly express my 'goals and objectives in having a good time on vacation', but my mind would have intuitively covered this aspect in a process of 'evaluation' and 'selection'. The difference between urban planning and the planning of every day activities is that urban planning explicitly expresses processes that otherwise may be intuitively carried out. As I have just expressed, the explicit articulation and adherence to a 'planning process', did not present an avenue that leads me to reneg my relativistic views, and to overcome my skepticism regarding 'general improvement'. However, my experience in urban planning had 'significant' results that I will express in the following chapter.

Chapter 5 RESULTS OF EXPERIENCE IN URBAN PLANNING

Foreword

My experience in urban planning led me to reach the decision to write this book. It also led me to recognize that I harbor an instinctive drive to plan, and at the same time, it tended to reinforce my instictive drive to plan. In addition, my practical experience led me to develop certain 'preferences' regarding planning in general.

The Decision to Write: The 'Drive for Personal Improvement', and the 'Hope for General Improvement'

As I mentioned earlier, I continued throughout my career to belive in relativism. While some of my colleagues and clients seemed also to believe in relativism, many others reflected opposite beliefs. Over the years, I encountered numerous 'absolutists' who maintained that assessments in the fields of architecture and urban planning are 'objective'. In particular, I encountered in recent years certain 'absolutist' urban planners who thought that their own assessments were 'correct' irrespective of what others thought or felt. Such encounters with 'absolutists' tended to rekindle my interest in relativism, and led me to develop an urge to express my relativistic views. However, I harbored the inhibition to express my views that resulted from my research in philosophy. As the urge to write persisted however, I searched my soul to find a way to overcome my inhibition to write. I entertained the following thoughts.

To begin with, I realized that I have continued to wish to live rather than to die. I decided that this constitutes an 'Aristotelian first principle' for me. As I continue to live, I constantly harbor feelings that can be described as '***contemplating the improvement of my predicament***'. In spite of my skepticism regarding the notion of 'general improvement', my action every day is influenced by '***an instinctive drive for personal improvement***'. I am unable to restrain myself from imagining conditions that appear to me to be 'preferable', that I strive to bring about. I realized that I neither could, nor wished to suppress these feelings. I came to the position that my drive to 'improve my own predicament' in this sense, constitutes another 'Aristotelian first principle' for me.

In contemplating what drives my action as I continue to live, I realized that I also harbor '***altruistic***' tendencies that influence my action. I am often preoccupied with considerations for how to 'improve' conditions for those I 'love', be it my children, grand children, relatives, or friends; whether what I contemplate as 'improvement' coincides with their 'expectations' or not. I am influenced by such 'altruistic' tendencies even with respect to complete strangers. I am one who gives his seat in a bus to an 'old lady', and who would 'willingly' let a 'suffering' patient see the dentist ahead of me. I realized that I do 'care' about others, and that, although I am uncertain about the results of my action, I entertain '***hopes***' at least, for the 'improvement of the predicament of others' through my action.

I also pondered how a prehistoric human could have felt if he witnessed his offspring, a close

relative, or a dear friend being devoured by a beast, as he hid helplessly in a cave unable to intervene. I also recalled instances where I suffered 'pain' from a toothache, injury, or illness, and pondered how I could have felt if I did not have recourse to medical help. ***In imagination***, 'I preferred to be living now, rather than ten thousand years ago'. Considering the human predicament ***in retrospect***, tempted me to entertain the proposition that "human conditions have 'generally improved' over time". I also pondered the notion of 'improvement' ***in the future***. I imagined how 'advances' in genetics and medicine could prolong life, and possibly 'improve the quality of life' in the future. Again, ***in imagination***, 'I contemplated a preference to have lived some time in the future rather than now'. This tempted me to reconsider my skepticism regarding 'general improvement' and the notion of 'progress'. However, I reminded myself that: a) the 'preferences' that I contemplate in imagining past and future conditions relate to my own 'subjective value system', others may have different 'preferences', and b) I am not certain about what the future holds, perhaps what I think of as 'advances' might bring about 'disasters'; after all, 'advances' in physics led to atomic bombs. I decided to maintain my skepticism regarding 'the general improvement of conditions for all, over time'.

I considered writing in the context that I expressed above: a) I wanted to 'get back' at those 'absolutists' who often 'frustrated' my practice, by at least, showing that relativistic thinking is possible, b) I imagined that a world of relativists perhaps might be more 'agreeable' to me, and wanted to 'spread the word' about relativism, c) I contemplated that a 'measure of acceptance' by others of what I say, could possibly lead to the 'improvement' of my own predicament, at least in the 'short' run, and d) I held a '***qualified hope***' in that what I will say ***might*** lead to the 'improvement of the predicament' of others. ***I decided that I could write to satisfy my own 'ulterior motives', while maintaining 'a guarded hope for improving my own predicament and the predicament of others***'.

I wish to stress that I decided to write while remaining 'faithful' to my relativistic 'views'. I am not writing with confidence in that what I say will lead to 'improving conditions in the world', nor am I writing with confidence that my writing will lead to 'my living happier for ever after'. I am writing for my own personal 'satisfaction', with the aim of fulfilling the 'goals' that I have just mentioned above. I harbor 'hopes' that what I say might lead to the 'improvement' of the predicament of others, but have no desire for 'pontification', or for 'pushing my views unto others'.

What to Write About: Relativism, and Conclusions Relating to Experience in Urban Planning

Having decided to write, I realized that expressing philosophical relativism only, could lead to a dead end, as had happened in the case of my aborted thesis. Furthermore, one is expected to derive conclusions from one's research and experience that 'could be put to use by others'! I decided to 'expound', realivism, ***and*** to convey certain resulted pertaining to my practical experience in urban planning. I have already expressed how I got to believe in relativism. I will indicate next certain 'lessons' that I gained from my professional experience in urban planning.

Planning Versus no Planning / The Tendency to Plan

Historically, a 'master builder' could have walked over the site designated for the erection of a building with a stick in hand. Relying on his 'vast' experience, he would have directly marked the plan of the building on the ground. The degree of effort in planning in this way has produced many an 'admirable piece of architecture' by my own 'recognition'. However, in spite of my 'long' past experience, I expend 'more' effort in planning a building; I would not be allowed by law to follow the ancient 'master builder's' way, even if I wanted to. The reader might think of me as being 'facetious' in citing this example. Another contemporary example might illustrate my point. In the field of urban planning itself, some planners have recently argued that: 'if we are unable to accurately predict developments in the future, and do not know what is good and bad for any particular community, why insist on controlling development through rigid planning?' Contemplating such thoughts, planners in many 'advanced' developed countries have assumed a 'reactive', 'laisser fair' position whereby they abolished previously legislated zoning codes and regulations that used to restrict the location of different types of land use, as well as the intensity of development of allowed uses. They argued further: 'let the private sector, and other entities propose new development, we will assess proposals for development and ensure that they will have no adverse impacts on the environment and the community'. In light of the advent of the 'information revolution', and its potential for changing the ways we live and work, I sympathize with the 'reactive' position. In spite of my sympathy with the 'reactive' approach and my tendency to avoid 'rigidity' in urban planning however, ***I continue to strive to plan***.

In recent years I asked myself '***why*** do I strive to plan?' In other words I tried to probe the 'reasons' that drive ***me*** to strive to plan. I went through the following considerations.

One of my main 'reasons' relates to the potentiality of 'wasting' resources. On the personal level, I plan for a vacation for example, in order to get the 'least expensive' prices for airfare and hotels in order to avoid 'wasting my money'. In the case of designing a building, which in contemporary practice is likely to comprise structural elements, air conditioning ducts, plumbing, wiring, pre-manufactured items, and so on, if I do not 'carefully' and 'rigidly' plan for the assemblage of these components beforehand, I am likely to encounter 'problems' during construction. I may have to have a wall knocked down after it has been erected, to allow a window to be installed or a duct to pass through for example, which is 'wasteful' of materials and human effort. The case of the provision of infrastructure and community facilities in urban planning provides another example in this context. People in many areas of the world are reproducing at certain rates that indicate that the population is likely to grow. The habits and rates of reproduction do not change 'over night'. I can be relatively 'confident' in predicting population growth for a period of say five years, quantify future needs, and prepare plans for future development. If I assume a 'laisser fair' scenario however, matters could conceivably develop in such ways that I find myself unable to locate a 'suitable' site for a school to accommodate the growing number of children, or an 'adequate' sewer main to collect effluent from new development. 'Solutions' can be found for such 'problems'. Children could be bussed to 'remote' locations, and an already installed sewer line could be replaced with a 'larger' pipe. 'Late' solutions however usually involve 'waste' of resources. Since I happen to be one who abhors 'waste', I try to plan for future events in an effort to avoid 'waste'. However, If I 'rigidly' adhere to my architectural plans, I may forego 'opportunities' to change the

building during construction in ways that I might 'prefer', which I 'discerned' only after the building has been partially constructed. I may plan for the installation of a sewer line and subsequent development materializes elsewhere from where I anticipated, thus leading to 'waste'.

Another main 'reason' relates to my 'desire' to bring about conditions that, in my imagination, appear to be 'preferable' to existing conditions, or to what I surmise future conditions would be if I do not take action. On the personal level for example, I might devise schemes to make 'more' money 'because' I imagine that acquiring certain material items will make me 'happy', or I may plan for a retirement fund for 'fear' of 'destitution' if I continue to live but be unable to work. In architecture I expend more effort in design 'because' I feel that perhaps this would lead to devising a scheme that, in the least, will give me personally 'greater pleasure' and 'satisfaction' from my work. I some times contemplate that this could lead also to greater 'appreciation' by others, which in turn could 'satisfy' my 'craving' for 'glory' and money. I entertain similar thoughts in respect of my efforts in urban planning. Again, the reader could imagine that my attempts to plan might not lead to the conditions that I imagined.

In summary then, I generally strive to plan in order to avoid or to contain the experience of 'negative feelings', such as those associated with 'wasting resources', and to attain or to increase the experience of 'positive feelings', such as those associated with the 'satisfaction of my desires'. This brings me back to square one, namely that my internal 'valuation mechanisms drive my action'. However, they 'drive' my action whether my action is contemplated and planned or not. The above considerations therefore may not provide a 'complete' answer as to 'why I generally ***tend*** to plan?'

I found a possible answer through consideration of the meaning of the word "success". I understand "success" to mean 'reaching a goal or an objective'. Returning to the example of experiencing a toothache, when I experience one, I aim to 'get rid of the pain', which would be construed as my 'goal'. If I add 'as quickly as possible', this could be construed as my 'objective'. Now, I can consider different ways to 'achieve' my 'objective'. I could hop in my car and drive around in the hope of finding a near by dental clinic, which I may or may not find. Also, I may or may not find a dentist present at the clinic that I find. Fulfilling my 'objective' would depend on my 'luck'. On the other hand I could devise a plan to reach my 'objective', by looking up the phone book, finding the nearest clinics, calling beforehand to ensure the availability of the dentist, and getting directions to reach my destination. The following thoughts occur to me if I contemplate selection among the 'unplanned' and 'planned' approaches: a) I can conceive the notion that 'a lucky guy who adopts the unplanned approach could possibly achieve his goal faster than a regular person who adopts the planned approach', and b) If I am faced with making the choice myself, I am unable to '***try out both options***', which involves 'going back in time', in order to 'establish' which of the two options leads to 'greater success in reaching my objective'. How then could I 'justify a preference among a planned and an unplanned approach'?

In searching for a possible answer I realized that I harbor a 'belief' that '***the extent of my planning might increase the probability of my success in reaching my goals***', a 'belief' that is that I can neither 'justify' let alone 'prove'. I decided to adopt this notion as yet another 'Aristotelian first principle' by which I stop my own 'regress of reasoning'.

'Success' in fulfilling my 'goals', might mean 'improvement of my own predicament in the short run'. However, to me, this does not 'equate' with 'general improvement' as I have defined it.

‘Reinforcement’ of the Tendency to Plan / Adoption of the Planning Process

As I mentioned above, I have recently realized that ‘in my quest for personal improvement, ***I tend to plan my activities***’. This instinctive drive does not relate to my professional practice only, but relates generally to my every day personal behavior. I do not plan all my activities all the time, but ‘***tend to try to plan***’. The extent of effort that I expend in planning depends on whether I plan for dinner, for an extended trip overseas, for the construction of a building, or for organizing activities in the development of a city. I consider my tendency to plan, and the extent to which I attempt to plan, as traits of ***my*** character that are not necessarily ‘shared’ by others. I do not claim that they ‘guarantee my success, nor the improvement of my predicament or that of others’. One of the main results of my professional experience in urban planning is that it reinforced this basic trait in my character.

In particular, I have developed a tendency to utilize the steps indicated in the planning process when I plan my own personal activities, as well as when I get involved in planning for others. I found the planning process to provide a model for organizing my thoughts when I attempt to plan. For example, it reminds me to ***explicitly*** consider ‘goals’ and ‘objectives’ when I try to plan. I did that when I contemplated to write this book for example. As I apply myself to planning, I try to ***explicitly*** recall the steps of data collection, analysis, and so on that I described in the previous chapter. I try to follow these steps in reaching decisions regarding the fulfillment of formulated ‘goals’ and ‘objectives’.

General ‘Preferences’ in Planning

If and when I decide to plan, or when through circumstance I find myself involved in urban planning, then I ‘***prefer***’ to pursue planning as I will explain next. I reiterate that I do not consider action according to any of my ‘preferences’, or any combination of them, as incarnating a ‘formula for success or improvement’.

Participation of the General Public in the Planning Process

When I plan my own activities I do sometimes seek the ‘advice’ of others. In particular, I seek ‘advice’ from members of my family and close friends who are familiar with my character. I usually express my ‘goals’ and seek ‘assistance’ in how to fulfill them. On the other hand, both on the personal and professional levels, when others seek my ‘advice’ I try to learn about their ‘needs’ and ‘goals’, in order to be in a position to offer ‘assistance’. I ‘prefer’ to involve those who seek my ‘assistance’ in the processes of my ‘reasoning’ and to solicit their participation in these processes. I have already explained how I tend to interact with a client who seeks my ‘assistance’ in designing a building. I try to pursue urban planning in similar fashion.

The participation of a single client in the process of designing a building, could be achieved through ‘informal’ verbal discussion in a series of ‘tette a tette’ sessions. However, this is ‘hardly’ possible in the case of urban planning, where I aim to reach and involve the general public. Since I am usually unable to meet those involved, I attempt to articulate the steps I go through per the planning process, make the information available to others, and hope to receive ‘feed back’ that allows me to

provide the required professional 'assistance'.

I wish to point out in this context that I consider my desire to promote public participation to '***predicate***' my adherence to an articulated and 'detailed' urban planning process. I alluded to this earlier in the quotation: "rational analysis provides a framework to ***display*** the decision maker's values and assessments". Thus, the articulation of my 'reasoning' as I go through the planning process allows public participation.

I have developed the following 'theoretical preferences' in my attempt to involve the general public: a) involve the 'largest' number of people that are 'likely' to be impacted by the results of an urban planning assignment, b) since usually I am unable to reach 'all', attempt to involve as many 'factions' of the community as can be discerned, and c) involve the public in the 'largest' number of steps in the planning process. I attempt to fulfill these 'preferences' within 'practicable' limits

Direct Public Participation in the Planning Process

I believe that 'representation' could involve 'distortions' in conveying the 'wishes' of any given community. Recent attempts by the US Congress to impeach President Bill Clinton illustrate how the people's representatives can act contrary to the 'wishes' of the majority of the people. Therefore, I 'prefer' to query people ***directly*** rather than through their representatives. I wish to point out that the continuing proliferation of personal computers, and the possibilities of electronic communication through the Internet, are making direct access to the general public progressively more 'practicable'.

Democratic Development of Consensus

In urban planning, varying degrees of conflict are encountered. One could encounter several 'factions' with opposing 'interests', or in some rare cases of 'smaller' projects, agreement by most, except for 'proverbial little old ladies' who might oppose any scheme for new development or redevelopment.

I consider the 'resolution of conflict' as a central 'challenge' to urban planning. I often approach assignments with 'optimism', thinking that a 'clever solution' could be found that would 'make everybody happy', perhaps momentarily but not 'for ever'. I have not been able to conceive such 'clever schemes' in practice. At least, a few individuals all ways remain 'disgruntled'. I have also thought that if I am allowed 'more' time to conceive a scheme for action, I might be able to satisfy 'more' people. In practice however, dead lines for completion of my work are specified, and I tend to adhere to them for financial 'reasons'. The moment usually arrives when decisions are made regarding the selection of a course for action, while those involved are still divided. Under these common circumstances one attempts to develop consensus. My 'preference' is to try to reach consensus in democratic fashion, and adopt the 'wishes' of the majority. In urban planning practice however, as with life in general, the vote of the 'powerful' tends to carry 'more weight' than the vote of the 'weak'. Irrespective, even when consensus is reached democratically, I still contemplate the notion of 'the dictatorship of the majority over the minority'. I therefore hold a 'guarded' preference for the resolution of conflict democratically. I harbor additional thoughts in this respect that relate to 'ethical' considerations, which I will express later in this book.

Consideration of 'Wider' Context

When I plan, I 'prefer' to consider the 'widest' possible context in space, in past and future time, and in number of parameters covered by study within 'practicable' limits. I have found that the degree of '***my confidence***' in ***displaying*** my planning efforts relates to the extent of the contextual expanse that I cover by study. I will cite an example from every day experience to illustrate my point. I may plan for a vacation, and may consider the parameters of location, available 'opportunities' for entertainment, and so on, but forget to consider the parameter of climate. I could reach my destination and face 'inclement' weather conditions which 'spoil' my vacation. Had I considered the ***additional*** parameter of the climate, I could have selected a different place to spend my vacation, i.e. I could have adopted a different course of action. I can go on to illustrate how the inclusion of 'more' parameters could conceivably impact my selection of a place to spend my vacation. Similar considerations apply in urban planning. I have found from practical experience that increasing the number of parameters that I take into consideration and expanding the spatial and time contexts that I cover by study, 'invariably impact proposals for action'. Accordingly, the consideration of 'wider' context increases my preparedness when I present my 'reasoning' in planning. It increases my ability to answer those who might raise the question 'did you consider such and such conditions?'

Adoption of the Strategic Planning Approach

The reader may have noticed that I used the words "within 'practicable' limits" in conjunction with all the 'preferences' that I cited above. My 'reason' for using this phrase is that the resources and time available for planning present 'constraints' that apply to all types of planning, and to all the kinds of 'preferences' that I cited. Now, limiting the various aspects of context to be covered by study involves the notion of 'criticality', and 'assigning priority to addressing the topmost critical issues within the constraints of available time and resources'. This amounts to my definition of strategic planning. Based on these considerations, I no longer 'believe' in 'comprehensive' planning. I 'believe' the proposition that strategic planning 'is the only practicable approach to planning'.

Summation

The activities involved in planning different types of activities are similar. However, certain aspects of the activities involved in urban planning are different. One of the main differences is that in urban planning one is likely to be involved with the public at large. Therefore, compared with architecture for example, urban planning which involves more people, potentially involves a 'larger' quantum of different 'value judgements', and thus more potential for disagreement and conflict. Historically, urban planning may not have been considered in this way. An architect could have conceived the plan of a city largely in intuitive fashion, while working directly with a potentate. In contemporary urban planning practice however, the urban planner is usually expected to articulate a 'planning process' which allows public 'debate', and the formation of consensus. The lessons I gained from my experience in following the contemporary version of urban planning can be summarized as follows.

Urban planning generally articulates the 'reasoning' processes involved in conceiving 'solutions'.

Adhering to an articulated planning process tends to 'facilitate' public 'debate', and the formation of consensus. Being a relativist, who 'prefers not to project his preferences to the outside world', an articulated planning process reinforces my tendency to seek the involvement of the largest number of people in my work. In addition, I found that adhering to an organized and formalized process of thought, i.e. the planning process, tends to help me to remember 'issues' that I might have otherwise missed. Accordingly, I tend to adopt an articulated planning process in planning all types my activities. Generally, I 'prefer' to apply the planning process as the framework of my approach to 'problem' solving, while allowing an 'inevitable' role for my intuition.

When I apply the planning process, I 'prefer' to apply it in the 'widest practicable' context. I 'prefer' to cover the 'greatest' number of parameters, and expand the context of study both spatially, and in past and future time, within 'practicable' limits. Generally, I have found that I develop 'greater confidence' in my planning efforts through widening the context of the scope of the parameters, the spatial expanse, and the duration of time that I cover by study. However, my 'preference' to expand the context that I cover in my planning efforts is usually 'constrained' by my consideration of 'practicability'. This leads me to adopt a strategic approach in planning that contemplates 'criticality' and 'prioritization' of my efforts. This allows me to 'contain' my efforts within 'the constraints of time and resources' that may be available for a given planning exercise.

My experience in urban planning also heightened my awareness of 'relativistic issues'. Actually, the 'relativistic' attitudes that resulted from my research in philosophy tended to 'sink more deeply' into my psyche in parallel with my increased involvement in urban planning. In addition, I encountered in the field of urban planning numerous situations where individuals held what I consider 'absolutist' positions that I found to be 'deleterious' to my consulting practice. I developed a 'strong' urge to address 'absolutists'. These circumstances rekindled my interest in the old subject matter of my doctoral thesis. 'More importantly', they provided me with an incentive to get around the dead end that I reached at the time that I aborted my doctoral studies. By the late nineties, I had developed a desire to convey the results of my experience, and reached the decision to write this book. My aim in writing was to express my relativistic views, and thus demonstrate to 'absolutists' that a relativistic position is possible. I also hoped that perhaps more people would adopt relativism as a result of my writing. As I mentioned, I contemplated fulfilling these aims within my 'intuitive quest for personal improvement', while harboring some 'hope' that what I say might lead to the 'improvement' of the predicament of others.

Now, I consider what I have said up to this point to generally fulfill the aims that initially drove me to write. I could have stopped writing at this juncture. However, at the early stages when I contemplated to write, I recalled past discussions with the professor who supervised my dissertation. He generally agreed with my relativistic 'views', but, in order to bring my work to some ***conclusion*** he frequently asked me: "can't you think of anything 'useful' to say?" My answer consistently was that "I do not believe in the notion of '***usefulness***' in the first place". The 'moral' to be discerned from our discussions is that 'when one spends much effort in research, one is usually expected to derive some concrete proposals for action based on one's research'. I sympathized with this 'moral' but, at the time I was writing my thesis I could not conceive: 'saying something ***usefu****l* while remaining faithful to my relativistic views'. Upon recent contemplation however, I was able to overcome this 'obstacle' in my mind. I did this in similar fashion to overcoming my inhibition to write this book in the first place. I rephrased my professor's query and asked myself: "as a result of my research and practical experience, ***can I conceive any proposals***, ***or rather suggestions that could be possibly used by others?***" *I realized that I could*. Per my

relativistic position, I am free to express 'views' and even 'suggestions for action', ***as long as I refrain from presenting my proposals as indicating*** '***the only possible courses for action that should be followed by all***', ***and, as long as I qualify my suggestions as not*** '***guaranteeing success or general improvement***'. Accordingly, I decided to investigate the potential application of the results of my years of experience.

The following chapters describe some of the ideas that I contemplated, and certain suggestions for action derived from my particular experience.

Part II APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS OF EXPERIENCE

Chapter 6 EXPLORATION OF POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS OF EXPERIENCE

Foreword

The main results of my experience that relate to writing this book are: a) the adoption of relativism, and b) the adoption of the methodology involved in an articulated and systematic planning process. My adoption of relativism resulted from my research in philosophy, and my adoption of the methodology inherent in the planning process resulted from my professional experience, in particular in urban planning.

When I contemplated writing, I decided to describe the road that led me to form particular 'views' regarding relativism and planning. I have done that. Also, as I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, I decided to explore the potential for applying the results of my experience towards the development of suggestions for action. The thoughts that I entertained in this context relate to ***the potential application of the planning process within the general framework of a relativistic position***.

In this chapter, I will relate some of the thoughts that occurred to me in this respect, and will indicate an 'unexpected' conclusion that I reached when I explored the potential application of the results of my experience.

Consideration of Topics to Address

I had come to 'appreciate' the articulated systematic planning process and wondered about how I could apply it within a relativistic context in the way of deriving suggestions for action. I did not start off by gathering and analyzing information in order to identify 'issues' that I would consider to address through application of the planning process. I had lived 'long enough' to have developed 'grievances', i.e. I had identified already numerous 'problems' or 'issues' that I could consider addressing through application of an articulated planning process. I will cite some of the 'grievances' that came to my mind.

One of the first 'grievances' I recalled for consideration concerned the relationship between men and women -oops- rather, between women and men. I recalled 'issues' regarding the 'equality' of women and men, the institution of marriage, the fulfillment of the sex drive, the upbringing of children, the 'drive for shopping', and so on. I have experienced marital 'spats' regarding such 'issues' in my own marriage, and witnessed similar 'spats' involving almost every married couple I know. In the United States at present, more than fifty percent of the individuals that are 'eligible' for marriage are not married. It is estimated also that roughly fifty percent of marriages in the US today will end up in divorce. I pondered: could respective 'goals' be articulated for women and men, or rather for 'factions' or even individuals of the two genders with respect to the 'issues' that affect their relations? Different religions and anthropology in general provide numerous different examples of alternative 'arrangements' for the relations between women and men. Perhaps 'novel arrangements' could be also devised. Would people be 'agreeable' to the conduct of a ***systematic*** query through an articulated planning process to formulate their individual 'goals', and to probe

alternative approaches to 'fulfilling' these 'goals'? 'Would society' or rather, 'would people collectively tolerate the coexistence of different arrangements to suit individual preferences'?

Another set of 'grievances' I contemplated relates to money. Acquiring 'more' money has developed in a way that 'incarnates' the notion of 'improvement'. I often feel that way about money myself, and am 'unsatisfied' with my feeling this way. Also, I entertained 'issues' regarding the distribution of money. For example, a 'successful' medical doctor could 'earn' ten times as much as a 'successful' architect or engineer. Certain individuals in the entertainment industry as well as in sports could 'earn' ten fold a doctor's income. There are yet currency 'speculators' who make billions for what might be considered as 'doing nothing'. Some economists will maintain that 'speculators are doing something', and further, that 'this something is positive' in the context of a capitalistic economy; my feeling is that they 'cause much suffering', as they 'enrich themselves'. Accordingly, while I generally sympathize with capitalism more than communism, I still harbor 'grievances' regarding capitalism. Economists continue to reiterate the statement that "unemployment has reached ***dangerous low levels***". I happen to be one who does not believe that 'at least five percent of a given population has to suffer in order for the rest of the population to make a reasonable living'. Contemplating these 'grievances' led me to wonder whether others would be 'interested' in defining 'goals' such as seeking the employment of all for example, and rethinking economic theory and practice in ***systematic*** fashion through an articulated planning process. Decisions and conclusions would be developed based on *direct* polling of the general public, rather than through any type of representatives, whether 'democratically elected' or not.

I contemplated other conditions that I happen to 'dislike', such as the prevalence of litigation and the role that some lawyers play in the US, and the 'promotion of aggressiveness' in business that appears to be admired worldwide at present. As I contemplated the 'grievances' that I cited, I realized that most, if not all the 'issues' that I might contemplate to address through application of a planning process are 'likely to involve ethical considerations'. I wondered whether the definition of 'morality' itself could be pursued by directly polling people in systematic fashion to define 'goals' to be attained through 'moral conduct'. I will address this topic in the following chapter.

I also considered the expansion of the spatial context of 'physical' urban planning to include the entire globe. For example one could conceivably define areas of the earth that are 'more suitable for accommodating humans' and 'promote' the settlement of the population of the world in these areas irrespective of national boundaries. One could avoid settling humans in areas that are prone to earth quakes, volcano eruptions, 'harsh' weather conditions, and so on, and avoid the 'waste' of resources associated with prevalent present conditions. Also, in my experience in urban planning, I have found that accommodating population growth 'inevitably' leads to conditions that can be considered 'detrimental' to the environment. Accordingly, one could consider 'containing the growth of the number of humans' through application of a planning process that integrates the 'values' of the population of the world at large in respect of self propagation. I recognized however, that such considerations would involve 'political issues' in addition to 'moral issues'.

Last but not least, I contemplated the application of an articulated planning process that directly involves the general public in addressing 'issues' regarding the survival of the human species. I surmised that others would probably be 'interested' in avoiding 'the fate of the dinosaurs', and might be inclined to consider the application of a systematic planning process in addressing 'perils' to survival.

Conception of the Notion of Tychiformation

As I contemplated the application of the planning process in addressing the kinds of 'issues' that I cited above, I realized that what I was considering amounts to: a) expansion of the application of planning to areas where traditionally, it has not been 'utilized', and b) addressing the topics I contemplated may be considered as an attempt towards the organization of 'civic society' through a planning process. Also, I thought that I would not define an attempt to address 'morality' in systematic fashion that contemplates the interactive participation of the general public as a "planning activity". Accordingly, I thought that the word "planning" no longer covered the widened scope for 'planning' that I contemplated. ***My intuition suggested that I am contemplating action to shape the future***, rather than action to ***plan*** for the future.

I looked up an English-Greek dictionary and selected the words "***tychi***" for "future", and "***forma***" for "shape", and coined the word "**tychiformation**" in December 1998. I conceived "tychiformation" as the word that would incarnate the kinds of suggestions for action that I was contemplating. I pronounce the word as if spelled 'tikey-formation'.

Summation

Exploring the possibilities of deriving suggestions for action based on the results of my personal experience led me to conceive the notion of tychiformation. This was quite surprising to me. I turned in the span of a few recent years from 'one who did not wish to say anything at all', to 'one who contemplates ideas about shaping the future of humanity at large'. My surprise was followed by feelings of 'excitement' however. My 'excitement' further reinforced my decision to write this book, and to explore the potential for tychiformation. I will express my thoughts regarding the potential for tychiformation in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 SUGGESTIONS FOR STRATEGIC DIRECT DEMOCRATIC TYCHIFORMATION

Foreword

In one sense, humans are, have been, and will continue to shape the future by their collective action. When I 'waste' paper, water, or energy, my action would have implications on the environment, and thus on shaping the future of the earth and humanity. Whether I have two or ten children also would impact environmental conditions and the future of humanity, since population growth is 'likely' to lead to 'negative' impacts on the environment. I may not be consciously aware of the implications of my action. The implications of 'wasting' natural resources, and of population growth on environmental conditions however, are being systematically understood and documented. Governments also shape the future by their action, although they may not allways involve the general public in decision making. ***Tychiformation***, ***by contrast to prevailing conditions***, ***proposes a conscious and*** '***willful***' ***approach to shaping the future that*** '***predicates***' ***the direct democratic involvement of*** '***as many people as possible***' ***in a systematic process to shape the future***.

Accordingly, tychiformation is not 'intended' to be pursued by any one individual alone. Now, to adhere consistently to my own understanding of tychiformation, I could stop writing at this juncture, and start to poll others about how to proceed with tychiformation.
Polling others regarding tychiformation is my ultimate aim in writing. However, in reaching my aim I wish to continue to further ***explore the potential for tychiformation***. What I will say in this respect, is not meant to be an attempt to shape the future on my own, but rather, an attempt to illustrate how tychiformation could possibly proceed. What I will say is conceived from my own personal perspective, and is presented in an effort to seek feed back on the concept of tychiformation itself.

Definition of Tychiformation

I suggest the ***definition of tychiformation*** as "***an attempt to influence***, ***or shape the future of humanity through application of a systematic planning process***". Furthermore, I suggest that the planning process that I described in Chapter 4, together with the 'preferences' regarding planning that I expressed in Chapters 5, to incarnate the systematic approach of tychiformation. Accordingly, ***tychiformation would attempt to adhere to the articulated steps of a planning process***, ***cover the*** '***widest***' ***context***, ***and directly and democratically involve the*** '***largest***' ***number of people within*** '***practicable limits***'.

Alternative Approaches to Tychiformation

Tychiformation, like urban planning could be approached in different ways. In Chapter 4, I described some of the common approaches to urban planning, such as the top down, bottom up, reactive, proactive, strategic, and comprehensive approaches. I suspect that all such approaches could be tested in the pursuit of tychiformation, with one exception. I have came to the conviction from practical experience that I might be able to plan for the construction of a building in 'relatively

comprehensive fashion'. However, I was never able to plan for action with respect to every nook and cranny of a town or city. Accordingly, as I indicated, I no longer believe in 'comprehensive' urban planning. Now, I consider tychiformation to involve 'several' orders of magnitude of complexity compared with urban planning. Therefore, I am unable to conceive a 'comprehensive' approach to tychiformation. Putting aside the potential for a 'comprehensive' approach, I have entertained the following thoughts regarding tychiformation.

Initiation of Tychiformation

The urban planning process is usually approached according to the steps that I indicated in Chapter 4, under the heading "The Urban Planning process / The Activities Involved in Urban Planning". It usually starts with the activity of gathering data or information about existing and past conditions, and proceeds to cover the steps that I indicated. However, as I mentioned, the process is iterative, and 'need not necessarily' be followed in rigid sequence. The urban planning process is often initiated when an 'issue' has been identified, or when a 'goal' has been stated. I suggest that tychiformation be initiated by polling people about 'issues' and 'goals', rather than by collecting other types of information. By this I mean that tychiformation would be initiated by gathering particular information regarding 'valuation' from the general public, rather than by gathering descriptive data about past and present socioeconomic and physical conditions, in addition to information that is available at present. The collection of additional information to what is available would proceed 'in light of' the expressed 'issues' and 'goals'.

Strategic 'Top Down' Tychiformation

This potential approach incarnates my own 'feelings' regarding 'criticality', and thus, it expresses my position regarding 'prioritization' and a strategic approach to tychiformation. I will refer to it as a 'top down' approach. The approach would consider initiation of tychiformation through articulation of particular 'goals', rather than through compilation of lists of 'issues' to be addressed. I have entertained the following thoughts with respect to such an approach.

I have come to conceive my desire to continue to live as an 'Aristotelian first principle' or premise. Furthermore, I have come to consider the related 'goal' to secure my own survival as 'most critical', since the fulfillment of other 'goals' would be meaningless to me if I ceased to exist. By extension, since those who commit suicide worldwide are less than one percent of the total world population, I can assume that approximately 99% of the population of the world would probably agree to adopt the 'goal' of "self-preservation". These considerations lead me to think that tychiformation could be initiated through attempts to articulate peoples' 'goals' with respect to ***self-preservation***, or ***survival***. Tychiformation would then proceed through identification of 'issues' or 'problems', 'opportunities', 'constraints', and alternative courses for action relating to the fulfillment of expressed 'goals' regarding survival.

This approach 'satisfies' two of my own 'concerns' at once: a) I consider survival to be 'most critical', thus, addressing survival as a matter of 'priority' would be 'in line' with a *strategic* approach to tychiformation, an approach that I tend to 'prefer' and, b) I suspect that the 'goal' of self-preservation 'holds promise for wide acceptance', and thus, it could provide a 'relatively solid base to build on'. The definition of 'goals' that I envision in this approach could conceivably proceed in pyramidal fashion.

Numerous 'goals' could be considered as 'closely related' to survival. For example, a set of 'goals' would relate to 'satisfying' my 'needs' for food, medical care, and so on. Others would involve 'satisfying' my instinctive drive for "self propagation" which involves at least one female. 'Satisfying' most of my 'goals' for survival would involve numerous other humans. Other 'goals' that could follow those relating to securing my existence might concern my 'well being' as I continue to exist. Contemplating both sets of 'goals' for 'securing my existence and my well being' leads me to consider my 'reliance' on, and 'need' for other humans. Accordingly, I could move from the 'goal' of self-preservation, to the 'goal' of securing the survival of the human species, or at least, securing the survival of 'a number' of other humans that 'I would require in order to secure my own survival and well being'. I suspect that the move from the 'goal' of self-preservation to the 'goal' of the survival of at least a 'number' of other humans could be spanned by a 'large majority' of humans.

The consideration of the 'goal' of the survival of some, could expand to consideration of the survival of 'the fittest', the survival of all humans, and further to unborn 'humans' or fetuses. Another possible expansion of the consideration of the 'goals' relating to survival and to 'well being' could relate to the survival of living entities in general. This could proceed to consideration of 'goals' to secure the survival of all life forms; i.e. animals, insects, plants, and microorganism, and even pathogens, since the latter are part of the ecosystem of life.

Another set of 'goals' relating to survival could be probed through consideration of potential threats to survival; threats that is to the survival of humans, as well as life in general as it is known on earth. I will address this topic in 'more' detail, since I consider the topic of the threats to survival, at least of the human species, to be of 'topmost critical and strategic importance'.

Current cosmological theory proposes the 'hypothesis' of a 'big bang' or explosion, as the incident of origination of the universe. Cosmologists are currently debating whether the universe will continue to expand as a result of the 'big bang', or whether the force of gravity will eventually bring the universe to an implosion, or a 'big crunch'. Either of the two alternatives would threaten the survival of humans and all forms of life that we know. I have read an article recently that contemplates what could possibly 'survive' in the case of a continually expanding universe. The article indicated a hypothetical 'ethereal' existence 'at best'. A 'big crunch' on the other hand would mean the annihilation of 'everything'. When I consider the survival of humanity in such an expanded time parameter, I come to the realization of a 'problem' that I do not know how to cope with.

As an aside, I happen to harbor certain 'views' regarding cosmology that I consider 'presumptuous', since I am neither a scientist nor a cosmologist. Namely, I have a 'gut feeling' that alternative 'hypotheses' to the 'big bang' could be possibly developed. In particular, I question the 'assumption' of a constant speed of light irrespective of the distance and the medium that light travels through. I question the 'assumption' that the red shift in the spectrum of light that has been measured on earth as 'necessarily' relating to an accelerating speed of celestial objects away from earth. That is to say, I question the 'assumptions' inherent to the 'hypothesis' of the 'big bang'. Accordingly, and based on sundry other considerations that I have gathered from reading in science and cosmology, I believe that alternative 'hypotheses' could be developed for 'small bangs' and 'small crunches' at galactic levels. In such a case, a 'small crunch' of the Milky Way, our galaxy, could lead to our annihilation. However, one could harbor some 'hope' under such a scenario. A

potential 'goal' in this context could be formulated to "prepare to abandon the Milky Way". The 'issue' in this scenario would be that we have not yet conceived any way to escape from the Milky Way if and when it implodes. A potential 'objective' in this context might state: "develop technologies for space travel at the speed of light, or 'near' the speed of light, or alternatively for instantaneous space travel by the year 'x' billion."

Within our own galaxy and solar system, scientist tell us that our star, the sun, is 'likely' to get bloated to a 'red giant' that would engulf earth and all other planets. If and when this happens, it could mean 'hell on earth'. A 'goal' in this context could be formulated to "prepare to abandon earth", and a related objective could state: "develop technologies for interstellar travel by the year 'y' billion."

In the mean time, i.e. until such 'catastrophic' cosmic events take place, we may continue to 'enjoy' living on earth; not 'necessarily' so. Scientists warn us about the potential bombardment of the earth by meteors and comments that could potentially 'reek havoc on earth', as they did according to theory 65 million years ago leading to the extinction of the dinosaurs. 'Goals' and 'objectives' in this respect could relate to developing strategies and technologies to divert the trajectories of such objects in order to avoid catastrophic damage to the earth, or possibly, its total destruction.

Other threats to the existence of humans and life on earth relate the physical composition and dynamic nature of earth itself. The movement of tectonic plates leading to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions illustrate some of the perils to existence related to the dynamic nature of earth. Science is striving to understand the dynamic earth, and 'goals' and 'objectives' could be possibly formulated to address related 'issues'.

In general, threats to our existence and survival come from different sources ranging from cosmological factors down to microscopic agents such as viruses. Tychiformation would be concerned with a systematic listing of such threats, and with attempts to address related 'issues' in strategic fashion.

Last but not least, threats to the existence of humans and life in general, could be related to the action of humans. One type of threat relates to the action of humans on the environment through pollution, and the modification of ecosystems, which could lead to the extinction of life on earth. 'Goals' and 'objectives' are being formulated in this respect. Some relate to 'issues', such as global warming and the reduction of the use of fossil fuels, and some could relate to the containment of population growth. I envision tychiformation to augment efforts to address environmental 'issues', and to increase public participation in addressing these 'issues'.

Another type of threat to the existence of humans relates to the action of humans upon other humans. The threat comes from crime, by one individual human killing another for some 'reason'. The threat to humans from other humans comes often also as a result of conflicts and wars, usually between different ethnic, religious, and ideological 'factions' of humans, or simply due to 'greed'. History provides an account of such conflicts, and of the associated casualties. More recent events in Ireland, Czechoslovakia, and the Middle East provide only a few contemporary examples of how humans kill other humans for various kinds of 'reasons'.
Consideration of the threat to the survival of the individual human by other humans, could be expanded to cover the threat to the individual's 'well being' through the action of others, such as through 'exploitation' for example. All such types of threat to humans through other humans,

whether relating to existence or to 'well being', would involve consideration of 'moral issues'. Accordingly, I suggest that an inquiry into 'moral' or 'ethical norms of conduct' be pursued through tychiformation. I would consider such an inquiry to be also of 'topmost strategic importance'.

Addressing 'moral issues' could be pursued by polling people about their 'expectations' in their interactions with other humans. In other words individuals could be polled about the 'goals' they wish to achieve in respect of their relations with other humans. From my perspective, I can contemplate a 'wish' list such as that others would not kill me, be 'courteous' and 'fair' rather than 'aggressive' and 'unfair' in their dealings with me, and so on. I can contemplate polling people in this context about the definition of "fairness" and "unfairness" for example. People could be polled also about whether they are willing "to accept that others to do unto them, what they contemplate doing unto others". Last but not least in this context, I would raise certain 'issue' relating to the practice of democracy. In particular, I would voice a 'concern' regarding the potential 'dictatorship of the majority'. In this context, people could be reminded that 'invariably they are bound to find themselves as part of a minority with respect to some of their views'. In such cases, would they be willing to accept and abide by 'the majority's will', even if they 'strongly' disagree with the majority's decision? Or, alternatively, would the majority tolerate the existance of conditions that differ from its expressed 'preferences'? Polling people in these ways would provide 'quantitative' information about people's 'feelings', and could 'influence' decisions regarding legislation relating to numerous types of 'issues', such as abortion for example. Ultimately, perhaps, a systematic tychiformist approach to the definition of 'moral norms' might lead to 'more tolerance' and 'a more liberal organization of civic society'.

From the above thoughts I have come to the conclusion that a strategic approach to tychiformation could be pursued along three 'main' lines involving consideration of 'goals', 'objectives', 'issues', 'opportunities' and 'constraints', and alternative courses for action relating to: a) survival of the individual and the human species, b) 'moral' or 'ethical' conduct, and c) the 'well being' or the 'quality of life' of the individual,. I 'reasoned' that:

1. I wish to survive
2. Contemplating the 'fulfillment' of my 'goal' to survive, leads me to realize my 'need' for other humans
3. The existence of other humans however, could potentially lead to 'conflicts' among us
4. I wish to devise 'moral' or 'ethical norms of conduct' that would 'facilitate' my coexistence with other humans
5. I wish to prolong my life 'as much as possible', and to maintain a certain 'quality of life' as I continue to exist
6. Contemplating the 'fulfillment' of my 'goals' regarding the 'quality of my life', ***confirms*** my 'need' for other humans
7. Consideration of 1 to 6 above ***confirms*** my wish to devise 'moral norms of conduct' to 'facilitate' my coexistence with other humans.

This progression of statements does not constitute 'a novel revelation' to me. We would not have religions, or the various types of organization of civic societies that exist in the world today if our ancestors did not think in ways similar to what I have just expressed. Thychiformation would attempt to continue and augment such efforts to organize civic society and to shape the future of humanity, albeit in a 'more' systematic fashion that involves the direct participation of the general public.

Bottom-up Tychiformation

A top down approach to tychiformation could lead to an exponential expansion of the 'goals', 'objectives', 'issues', etc. that would be presented to the general public for consideration. Polling people about 'criticality' and 'priorities' would be pursued in an effort to match tychiformation efforts to 'available resources'. Irrespective however, tychiformation could proceed in bottom up fashion, i.e., by addressing particular topics of 'interest'. As in urban planning, tychiformation efforts 'need' not be halted awaiting the results of a top down approach. All types of topics relating to the organization of civic society for example could be addressed independently in parallel with the top down approach that I outlined. 'Issues' relating to economic theory and practice could be pursued independently. Although 'ethical' considerations that could be derived from a top down approach would be involved in such kinds of exercise, bottom up tychiformation could still be attempted. Assumptions, such as "equal compensation for equal output" could be proposed for adoption in a bottom up tychiformist approach to addressing economic 'issues', pending 'resolution' of this 'ethical issue' from a top down approach. That is to say, people could be polled regarding the 'acceptability' of the notion of equal pay for productivity whether by a female or a male, a black, red, yellow, or white person for example, 'without necessarily having resolved all moral issues in top down fashion'. All types of 'issues' could be addressed and pursued in similar bottom up fashion.

Reactive / Proactive Tychiformation

Tychiformation, like urban planning, is 'likely' to involve both reactive and proactive attitudes. The reactive attitude would be reflected in the acceptance of prevailing conditions and trends, while the proactive attitude would be reflected in a willingness to modify and change conditions. The mixture of the extent of the proactive and reactive attitudes to tychiformation would materialize in the results of polling the public regarding each particular topic under consideration. Personally, I am prepared to assume a proactive attitude with respect to numerous issues, i.e. I am willing to accept and suggest change if change appears to 'suit my purposes'. However, I would still tend to be 'cautious' in implementing change. My vote would support evolution, rather than revolution.

Tentative Formulation of the Goals of Tychiformation

According to the definition of tychiformation, no one person is to be entrusted with its' pursuit on his/her own. Tychiformation, and especially the formulation of its goals, is intended to be a collective endeavor. However, in an effort to clarify how tychiformation would work, I will express what I consider to be the main strategic goals of tychiformarion:

1. **Prolong the life of the individual human as long as possible / indefinitely.**
2. **Secure a habitat for humans for as long as possible / indefinitely.**
3. **Provide optimum conditions for the happiness of all humans.**

These goals, especially the third, may be considered too general and vague. I invite all to participate in the formulation of such goals for tychiformation. Similar goals were contemplated in the past, and may have been partially fulfilled. The pharaohs expended much effort to attain

immortality. One can debate the extent of their success in achieving their goal. Now however, with the advent of scientific advances, it is possible to seriously contemplate the feasibility of such goals! Advances in achieving goal #1 would be probably gradual, and eternal life may or may not be attainable! Securing goal #2 may or may not be possible forever. In other words, it may be only possible to delay the death of the individual, and to postpone the extinction of life! Happiness for all may be more elusive to define and achieve!

Potential Implementation of Tychiformation

The extent to which tychiformation would be implemented would relate to the number of people who elect to 'believe' in a tychiformist approach, and to the extent of the 'resources' that would be committed to the pursuit of tychiformation. If tychiformation takes off at all, it might be pursued as a 'limited' experiment or pilot project to test the 'viability' and 'practicability' of tychiformation. Several experiments with tychiformation could be pursued in parallel. Alternatively, tychiformation could be accorded resources matching the Human Genome Project. Consideration of such a potentiality leads me to recognize a 'practical constraint' to tychiformation. The Human Genome Project involves a 'large' number of scientists working in their labs. A Tychiformation Project of similar magnitude could involve a 'large' number of scientists as well as 'experts' from various disciplines. However, compared with the Genome Project, a Tychiformation Project would attempt to involve the general public, in addition to 'experts'. The question arises as to how much time could people possibly 'dedicate' to responding to tychiformation queries? I guess this would be found through trial. Perhaps people would make a habit of visiting the *www* for a few minutes a day to register their vote on tychiformation 'issues'! Perhaps someday television would be developed to be interactive, whereby a person might watch the news, and use his remote control to register his vote on tychiformation 'issues' that would be presented for a few minutes after the news broadcast. The extent of people's 'interest' would ultimately influence the pace of tychiformation.

I would 'prefer' that tychiformation be pursued internationally, in an attempt to involve and allow the integration of the myriad of different ideas and attitudes of as many 'factions' of people, and as many 'cultures' as 'practicable'. The availability of computers and the possibility of reaching the general public would vary in different countries. Perhaps the United Nations could be involved in organizing efforts to 'overcome such problems'. Since one could not 'hope' to reach 'all' however, statistical sampling techniques could be used in a tychiformation effort as they are being used in current polling efforts.

Who would be 'Entrusted' with Tychiformation?

I would 'prefer' tychiformation to be conducted by 'independent' entities. On the one hand, new 'independent' institutions for tychiformation could be established. Of existing institution, I would 'select' universities for conducting tychiformation efforts for two 'reasons': a) universities are 'presumably independent' of 'political influence', and b) universities are usually comprised of faculties that could provide the myriad of different types of 'experts' in the fields that I envision would be involved in tychiformation. Furthermore, I can imagine Faculties or Departments of Philosophy within universities to potentially spear head tychiformation. They have 'thinkers' and 'experts' familiar with humanity's philosophical experience in 'ethics', which I consider as 'central'

to tychiformation. Perhaps, the involvement of thinkers and philosophers in tychiformation might revive the 'hope' for the materialization of the proverbial "Philosopher King". The United Nations could be involved also in tychiformation, and could possibly assume a leading role in tychiformation efforts.

Summation

The potential strategic program for tychiformation that I expressed represents an 'intuitive' and 'tentative' program that incarnates my own 'views' regarding 'criticality'. However, tychiformation could conceivably start by polling the 'largest' number of people that could be reached through the *www* for example, and attempt to involve them in the definition of 'issues' to be addressed. A list of 'issues' would be compiled. Those polled could be queried regarding the 'criticality' or 'priority' of 'issues' to be addressed. Alternatively, they could be at once queried to list their 'grievances in order of priority'. The steps of a systematic planning process would be then pursued in view of reaching conclusions regarding the 'topmost priority issues' within 'practicable limits'.

Tychiformation would proceed by involving those who could be reached in 'as many' steps of tychiformation 'as practicable'. Those who could be reached would be involved for example in the conception of alternative scenarios for action, the 'evaluation' of alternatives, and so on. Their involvement would be pursued until a 'consensus' for action is reached democratically with respect to each 'priority issue' that had been selected for 'resolution'. All of this would be pursued within 'practicable limits'.

The results of tychiformation efforts and queries would 'influence' politicians and Governments in a way similar to that of present polling surveys. The difference of the potential 'influence' of tychiformation compared with present polling approaches would relate to the systematic utilization of planning processes in tychiformation, and possibly, to the choice of a strategic approach to tychiformation that would address 'issues of the utmost importance in order of priority'.

I have mentioned in the previous chapter some of the 'grievances' that came to my mind that I considered as potential 'issues' to be addressed through tychiformation. I suspect that 'many' others might entertain citing similar 'issues' if polled about their 'grievances'. I suspect that many would express 'grievances' regarding money, sex, and health in some order of 'priority'. However, in my case, when I considered tychiformation, I changed the order of my 'priorities' to: 1) securing my existence and the existence of humanity, 2) addressing 'moral issues', and 3) addressing 'the quality of life of humans'.

Most of us have secured their survival, at least ***temporarily***. Accordingly, most of us, like myself, no longer 'pay attention' to the potential 'perils to our own existence and the existence of humanity'. I suspect that most of us are unable to stop the drive to plan, which we now apply to 'improving our own condition'. 'Improvement', in turn, is 'likely to be equated' with 'acquiring more money' and with the 'fulfillment' of sundry other 'wishes'. ***My own change of mind regarding the* '*priory*' *of addressing* '*issues*' *starting from those relating to survival*, *might illustrate* '*the potential consequences of assuming a strategic tychiformist attitude*'!

The strategic approach to tychiformation that I suggested would start with topics regarding survival, and would proceed to topics regarding 'moral issues', and further to the consideration of the 'quality of life' of the individual human. My reason for suggesting this order relates to my 'subjective assessment of criticality', and moreover, to my suspicion that 'greater' degrees of agreement might be attained in considering categories of topics in this order. This suspicion would be confirmed or negated based on actual polling of the general public.

EPILOGUE

Roughly forty years ago, I embarked on an expedition to discover foundations that I could build on in a doctoral thesis. The expedition led me through a myriad of subjects, to philosophy. I dug, as deep as I could, but did not find the 'foundations' I sought. The residual impression from my expedition was that ***I tended to believe that***: "human knowledge is similar to a balloon or a float, and not a pyramid". I have continued to think this way since then. I became, and continued to be the kind of skeptical general relativist that I have tried to portray in this book.

Skepticism, which I consider to be related to relativism, can lead to inaction. Browsing the net recently I stumbled upon an article about skepticism that I 'liked'. The article, by Peter Suber, is entitled "Classical Skepticism / Issues and Problems". It illustrates the notion of 'the inaction of a thorough skeptic'. I do not consider myself a 'through skeptic' as described in this article. I have 'selected' and adopted 'views' that a 'thorough skeptic would consider unfounded'. For example, I entertain the statement "I exist". If I attempt to pronounce such a statement in the presence of a 'thorough skeptic', I suspect that he would stop me short in my tracks immediately after I utter "I". He would ask me to define what I mean by "***I***"! I might retort by asking: "and who are ***you*** to ask ***me*** this question!?" This hypothetical encounter illustrates 'my feelings regarding thorough skepticism, and the problems inherent to philosophy and the use of language in general'. My particular 'relatively limited version of skepticism' relates to my skeptic attitudes towards what I consider 'hypotheses', and towards the notion of 'general improvement'.

Aborting my doctoral thesis illustrates 'the types of potential problems associated with skepticism and relativism'. However, in retrospect, I think that my inaction with respect to completing my thesis did not relate to my relativistic beliefs 'as much as' it related to the expectations of others. I was not prepared to make generalized statements of 'value judgement' to meet the expectations of others. I believe that I have come around my inaction in conveying my thoughts to others: a) through ***consistent*** adoption of relativism, and b) through ***explicit*** recognition of my own instinctive drive for '***imagined*** personal improvement', combined with 'a ***hope*** in that what I say and do ***might*** lead to the improvement of the predicament of others'.

The relativistic attitudes that I have developed over the years incarnate an approach to thinking that differs from what I had discerned in philosophy. The attitudes that I have developed ***relate thinking to existence and to action***. I 'sympathize more' with "I am, therefore I think", than with "I think therefore, I am", while keeping my reservations regarding the use of "therefore" in both statements. However, I 'prefer': "I exist, I am instinctively driven to continue to exist, and am instinctively driven to think and to plan for my existence". I am not a 'thorough skeptic' who is unable to act, I am one who is instinctively driven to act. Accordingly, "I think in order to conceive courses for action", and, "I do not think in order to discover absolute truth".

My drive to exist and to plan for my action combined with my experience as an architect and urban planner led me to develop certain 'preferences ' regarding ***how to plan***. The combined results of my instinctive drives, my exposure to philosophy, and my practical experience led me to conceive tychiformation.

In closing, I wish to express certain thoughts regarding the three main topics of this book, namely: relativism, planning, and tychiformation.

Concluding Thoughts on Relativism

My relativistic position is reflected in my use of language. I allow myself to make assertions about what "***I perceive***", how "***I feel***", and what "***I believe***". This can be discerned from what I have written; I suspect that I have broken the record in the incidence of "I" per bites of text. Also, I limit my use of the words "true" and "false" to propositions relating to perception per every day common sense. I do not use "true" and "false" in conjunction with what I consider 'the hypotheses of science and philosophy, and the generalized statements of value'. In science I refer to propositions or theories not as "true" or "false", but rather as "more closely, or most closely matching observations". In philosophy, where diametrically opposing views are proposed, I revert to the use of the words "believing" or "disbelieving" with respect to philosophical propositions. I have presented relativism as a 'belief' accordingly. In addition, I attempt to refrain from using the words "right" and "wrong", "beautiful" and "ugly", "should" and "must", and a host of other related words that I consider to involve 'an attempt to generalize subjective value judgement'. Last but not least, I reserve the use of the word "proof" to the realm of logic where premises are defined and agreed to; I do not use "proof" and "proving " in discussions of in the fields of architecture and urban planning.

I have found myself a member of a 'small' minority as I tried to adhere to the attitudes that I have just expressed regarding the use of language. Newspapers, art criticism, philosophical treatise, and even 'scientific' writing, let alone every day conversations 'are rife with assertions of the kinds that I attempt to avoid'. I am not satisfied even with my own writing, in spite of my concerted attempts to avoid what I consider 'the pitfalls inherent in language'. I ascribe my 'difficulties' when I try to use language to express my beliefs, and my 'dissatisfaction' with the use of language generally to 'the structure of common language'. Logical positivists have addressed this topic. I wish a new language could be invented that would not 'entrap' my thoughts. Perhaps logic could provide 'clues' in the way of conceiving such a language!

Irrespective of how prevailing conditions in the use of language have materialized however, it seems to me that in every day experience 'one is often expected to make generalized assertions involving value judgement'. In my professional experience, as I have mentioned, I was often expected by my clients to make such assertions. I have used "should" and similar words in practice, reluctantly, in order to conform to such expectations. From my relativistic perspective, I wish that 'more' people would adopt similar attitudes to mine in the use of language!
Browsing the net more recently, I encountered certain statements relating to relativism that I wish to address:

- Some in philosophy refer to relativism as an "untenable position". I hope that I have 'demonstrated', not 'proved', that at least one person, I, has adopted and adhered to relativism for roughly forty years.

- Some in philosophy refer to relativism as "a most derided position". I do not feel this way about relativism. I believe that those who abhor relativism 'harbor hopes of attaining ***absolute truth*** through philosophical investigation', a proposition that I question, and that I do not accept.

- Some in philosophy maintain that relativism means that: "all propositions are equally valid". I do not think that. From my perspective, 'I do not believe that validity exists in vacuum or thin air'. I tend to believe that 'the validity of any particular proposition is an event in an individual

brain, brains are different, and the validity of a given proposition materializes in different ways in different brains'.

- Some may think that relativism means that 'anything goes', or in other words, that a believer in relativism 'would have no principles'. I consider action 'as driven by instinctive and inherited, i.e. genetic, and acquired programs'. In my own case, although a relativist, I constrain myself from killing other humans, from stealing, and from 'abusing' others. I harbor 'principles and moral codes that drive my action'. I have found it 'difficult' to shake down these 'principles and codes'. However, I think that belief in relativism 'might ***tend*** to emancipate an individual from the acquired category of codes that drive his action'. The extent of emancipation would vary depending on 'the nature and nurture of each particular individual'.

I suspect that some may harbor relativistic thoughts, but may not have had the occasion to sort out their views with respect to relativism. Perhaps my experience in sorting out the inconsistencies in my own mind that led me to adopt relativism *consistently* could 'interest' others, and possibly, lead to 'increasing the number of relativists in the world'. I have expressed this 'hope' earlier as one of the 'goals' that drove me to write this book. I would like to articulate my 'hope' further. A 'relativist' might refrain from 'projecting his value judgement', but, depending on his 'nature and nurture', may pursue the fulfillment of his 'desires' in 'ruthless fashion'. Wide spread belief in relativism would not by itself eliminate aggression. However, belief in relativism, which would incorporate skepticism regarding the notion of 'good and bad, and right and wrong', might tend to tamper 'fanatic zeal', and thus, might lead to 'more tolerance in the world'! At any rate, what I look forward to is a world of '*moral* relativists', where 'morality' is defined collectively in a tychiformation effort.

Concluding Thoughts on Planning

I have come to recognize my tendency to plan as an intuitive trait of my character. I tend to plan with 'the belief that planning might increase the probability of fulfilling my goals', while maintaining my skepticism regarding 'general improvement' as I have defined it. My suggestion to 'widen' the scope of planning to tychiformation is an expression of a personal 'preference'. It remains to be seen whether others would sympathize with my suggestion!

Concluding Thoughts on Tychiformation

I mentioned earlier that each of us contributes to shaping the future through his action. People do this with varying degrees of awareness of the potential impact of their deeds, and often without 'willful' planning and 'purpose'. Science and philosophy could be considered to have 'contributed to shaping the future of humanity' although they may not have been 'intentionally pursued towards this end'. I wish to add to this that many 'organized' and 'willful' efforts to shape the future have been, and continue to be undertaken. History provides an account of past efforts. What environmentalists and those involved in space exploration do, are contemporary examples of such efforts. In recent years, efforts relating to environmental protection, and to space exploration have picked up pace. Movies depicting the perils to our existence have been made. Accordingly, the 'awareness of issues', and the attempts to plan for the future in organized ways are underway, and

are receiving ever more attention and dedicated effort. In introducing tychiformation, I am suggesting the augmentation of these efforts in a 'more organized fashion'. In particular, I suggest that efforts to influence and guide the future of humanity be pursued by:

1. Identification of 'critical issues', and addressing 'topmost priorities' in ***strategic*** fashion.

2. Adopting a systematic planning approach that ***explicitly*** articulates a 'reasoned process' that covers the 'widest possible context in space, time, and content, and which allows synthesis of considerations from as many different parameters as practicable'

3. Involving 'the largest number of individuals ***directly*** in addressing tasks 1, and 2 above within practicable limits'.

From my own perspective, I would tentatively 'prioritize issues' for a strategic approach to tychiformation in descending order starting with 'issues' relating to survival, followed by 'issues' relating to 'morality', leading to consideration of 'issues' relating to 'quality of life'. However, these categories of 'issues', and/or subcategories of these 'issues' could be pursued in parallel, or in different order according to people's 'wishes'.

People talk about how the Internet has, and will continue to change the way we go about our lives. It has already impacted the ways we seek information, and the ways we acquire goods for example. Internet sites also provide information about legislative 'issues'. Some sites provide information about how politicians vote, and invite the public to register their vote in respect of the issues under consideration. I consider such efforts as attempts to 'use the Internet while following prevailing traditions'. Tychiformation on the other hand, would take 'fuller advantage of Internet capabilities' by involving the general public in the 'identification, and prioritization of issues' to be addressed in the first place, and further, in all consequent steps to reach decisions for action.

Some may think that the universe, and the human predicament in particular, reflect chaotic conditions that would 'defy' tychiformation. I am not suggesting that tychiformation would 'solve all the problems of the world'. I am suggesting that we experiment with tychiformation, and see what would happen! Being an 'optimist', I harbor a 'hope' that 'jointly, we can continue to devise ways to coexist, and to secure our existence'!

I wish to end my pronunciations regarding tychiformation with an 'apology'. I have contemplated a 'much more rigorous' delineation of the potential for tychiformation than I have actually expressed in this book. I have two 'excuses' for not having elaborated on the subject of tychiformation. The first 'excuse', to which I have alluded already, is that I 'prefer' to wait for feedback from others before proceeding with further exploration of the potential for tychiformation. The second 'excuse' which I want to express now, is that I wrote this book while in the mood of 'an old man in a hurry'. At roughly 65, I have 'opted' to ***introduce the concept*** of tychiformation as 'quickly as possible', rather than to dwell on further elaboration of the concept. Now, I look forward to participate with others in a 'more rigorous' pursuit of tychiformation.

Summation

I have related the tale of my adventures in thought. I described the road that led me to adopt relativism, and the circumstances that led me to develop 'preferences' to plan. I have also made suggestion for tychiformation based on my particular past experience. My intention in having done so is not to conclude by telling others "thou shalt" think or act in some particular way, but rather, my intention is to raise the question: "***what do you think?***"